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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH

CASE NO. 890366-CA

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff and Respondent

Priority - 3

VS.
REID H. ELLIS,
Defendant and Appellant

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JURISDICTION;
The basis for this appeal, is found in 78-4-11,
UCA, and under Rules 3 and 4, Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals. The Defendant was convicted by a jury of three
separate offenses; Assault on a Peace Officer, Possession of
Alcohol, and Retail Theft. He had made timely Motions for
Change of Venue , to Dismiss and for Suppression of
Evidence, all of which were denied. He appeals from all of
these actions of the Circuit Court
STATEMENT OF ISSUES:
The following issues are presented for Review:
1. Whether the court erred in refusing to grant
Defendant's Motion for Change of Venue.
2.Whether
the
court
erred
in
allowing
the
prosecution to change a charge of "Interfering with a Peace
Officer", a class "B" misdemeanor to a charge of "Assault on
a Police Officer, a class "A" misdemeanor.
3. Whether the officer arrested the Defendant

2.
illegally, ie. without a warrant, for a misdemeanor occuring
outside his presence.
4. Whether the Court erred in not suppressing
evidence obtained after an illegal arrest, without warrant.
5. Whether the Court erred in not overturning a
conviction based on evidence so lacking and unsubstantial
that reasonable men could not reach a verdict of guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES & CASES:
The Defendant considers the following to be
determinative of the issues herein:
1. Article I, Section 14, Utah Constitution;
" The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and siezures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be siezed."
4th Amendment, U.S. Constitution .
Identical wording to that quoted above in Art.I,
Sec 14, Utah Constitution.
2. Utah vs. Bradshaw
for in Addendum #1.

541 P2d 800, photocopy set

State vs. Mendoza 748 P2d 131 , photocopy set
forth in Addendum #2.
State vs. Hygh, 711 P2d

264, photocopy

set

forth in Addendum #3.
State vs. Gallegos, 712 P2d 207 , photocopy set
forth in Addendum #4.

3.

State of Washington vs. Dresker
photocopy set forth in Addendum #5.
State of Oregon vs.
photocopy set forth in Addendum #6.

Roberts

693 P2d 846,

706

P2d

564,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
Defendant was arrested in Laketown, Rich County,
in connection with a report phoned in by the proprietor of
the Old Rock Store, in Laketown, to the County Sheriff, in
Randolph, some 20 miles away, that she may have had a 12
pack of beer stolen by a group of teenagers. (Transcript of
Motion to Suppress, p.5; Trial Transcript, P138)
The Sheriff, who was not present when the alleged
theft occurred, did not have a Warrant. (Trial Transcript
pp. 51 thru 54). His informant told him that there were
four boys involved, but when the beer was allegedly taken,
one boy (the defendant) was not in the store, but was
waiting in the car. (Transcript of Motion to Suppress,
Testimony of Renee Early, pp 8-9)
Neither the store
proprietor or the Sheriff was sure, at the time of their
phone call as to which three boys were involved, and which
one was not.
The Sheriff went to the Bear Lake Cabin belonging
to Defendant's mother's family, the Hardings, where he
placed Defendant under arrest, and took physical custody of
him, based solely on the phone complaint from Mrs. Early.
(Transcript of Motion to Suppress, p. 53, 54 & 55) The
Sheriff
marched Defendant around the cabin to where the
other boys were, the Sheriff saw a can of beer, unopened on
the floor beside a bed. He put a handcuff on Defendant.

4.
The boys demanded to see his Warrant of Arrest, and/ or a
Search Warrant, (the Sheriff was not wearing a uniform or a
badge) and demanded that he leave the cabin if he did not
have one, (Trans, of Motion to Suppress, p.59) he replied
that he did not need one, and proceeded to forceably attempt
to cuff the Defendant's other wrist, which action Defendant
resisted.(Transcript of Motion to Suppress, pp 260,
) The
action of the Defendant, knowing he had committed no offense
is justified, (See Utah vs. Bradshaw 541 P2d 800, Addendum
#1.)
The other boys, who until then were sitting on
their beds, protested the use of such violence by the
officer; the Sheriff then pulled a loaded pistol from his
belt holster, brandished it in the faces of the boys, and
dragged the defendant, by the one fastened cuff, across the
cabin. The defendant braced his feet on the doorframe and
refused to go with the sheriff, who then went back to his
car and radioed for assistance. His call was responded to
by two State Park officers, a Fish and Game officer, and a
Utah Highway patrolman.
Two 15 year old boys went up to the sheriff to try
to reason with him, and get the sheriff to talk to their
father on the telephone. The sheriff handcuffed them to the
fence. The five armed officers, with loaded pistols and
shotguns, and a police attack dog then proceeded to raid the
cabin, forceably and violently throw down and handcuff the
Defendant and another 18 year old boy who were pleading all
the while for the officers to talk to their father, and
attorney, on the phone.
After taking the boys to Jail, in Randolph, the
sheriff obtained a Search Warrant from the local Justice of
the Peace, Raymond A. Cox. The Sheriff and other officers
searched
both the cabin, and the defendant's car, and
found no evidence of the 12 pack of Milwaukee 3est Beer
allegedly stolen from Mrs. Early.
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The defendant and other 18 year old boy were
issued misdemeanor citations, charging him with theft, under
76-6-602 UCA, Illegal Possession of Alcohol under 32A-12-13
UCA (both Class "B" misdemeanors) and Interferance with a
Police Officer, under 76-8-305 UCA, a Class "B" misdemeanor.
They were arraigned the same day, November 14, 1988, before
the Justice of the Peace, who after receiving pleas of "Not
Guilty" on all charges, released defendant on his own
recognizance. The sheriff however refused to release the
boys, claiming he was going to file additional charges, so
that Defendant's father had to put up bail, and receive the
permission of Judge Perry, the Circuit Court judge to take
the boys, before the sheriff would release defendant. Six
weeks later, the County Attorney after having the charges
transferred to the Circuit Court, filed an Information,
charging the Defendant with :
Retail Theft, under 76-6-602 UCA (CI. "B")
Unlawful Possession 32A-12-13 UCA (CI. "Bn)
and
Assaulting a Police Officer, 76-5-102.4 UCA, (a
Class "A" misdemeanor, and a totally different and more
serious offense.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS:
POINT I:
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT A CHANGE OF
VENUE.
POINT II:
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING AMENDMENT
CHARGES TO DIFFERENT AND MORE SERIOUS CHARGES.

OF

THE

POINT III:
DEFENDANT WAS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT

6.
FOR A MISDEMEANOR ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED OUT OF THE OFFICER'S
PRESENCE.
POINT IV:
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUPPRESSING
OBTAINED EVIDENCE, OBTAINED WITHOUT A WARRANT.

ILLEGALLY

POINT V:
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT OVERTURNING A CONVICTION
WHEN THE EVIDENCE WAS SO LACKING AND UNSUBSTANTIAL THAT
REASONABLE MEN COULD NOT REACH A VERDICT OF GUILTY BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT.
ARGUMENT:
POINT I:
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO GRANT A CHANGE OF VENUE.
Defendant made a timely Motion for Change of
Venue, based on the fact that in the tiny county of Rich,
that he, as a "Summer people", could not receive a fair
trial. His motion was supported by the required affidavits,
one from Defendant and another from Wayne Parry, who
testified as to the prejudice against outsiders in Rich
County, where he resided from age 15 thru 18, and where he
was constantly
hassled
by Sheriff
Cockayne
and his
department.
The County seat in Rich County is in Randolph,
population around 500.
The sheriff is a resident of
Randolph.
(Trial transcript, p. 105). Five of the six
jurors are residents of Randolph, the sixth is from
Woodruff, three miles away, population 200.
the total population of Rich County is only 1615.

7.
Seven of the 17 member jury panel had heard of the case,
(Trial Transcript, pp. 8 thru 23) through neighborhood
gossip or were acquainted with the officers personally, so
that defense counsel had to either waive one of his
statutory challenges or come back on a subsequent date.
Several of those jurors selected had heard gossip about the
case.
The signal case on Change of Venue is of course
State vs. James, 99 Ut Adv. Rep. 14, decided January 6,
1989, copy of which is attached as Addendum #7. The factors
necessary to see that a fair trial is accorded are, as the
court found in State vs. James; Standing of Accused and
Victim in the community, Size of Community, Nature and
Gravity of Offense, Nature and Extent of Publicity.
In this case, in a county where there is no newspaper, where
the jurors living in the same or next small town denied
knowing the Sheriff, a lifelong resident, with 8 years in
police work, and where defendant is accused of Assault on
the same officer, it defies logic that those jurors could
give a fair decision. The Jury Verdict, flying in the face
of the store owners admission that this Defendant was not
present in her store when the alleged shoplifting occurred
only evidences the underlying truth: the defendant could not
expect a fair trial in Rich County.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING AMENDMENT
CHARGES TO DIFFERENT AND MORE SERIOUS CHARGES.

OF

THE

Rule 4, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, (77-35-4
(d) UCA), allows amendment of an Information, subject to
certain limitations:

8.
"The Court may permit an indictment or Information to be amended at any time before
verdict if no additional or different offense
is charged and the substantial rights of the
defendant are not prejudiced.w
In this case, Defendant was originally given a
Citation to the JP Court, where he was arraigned November
14, 1988, the day of the incident and entered "Not Guilty"
pleas to : 1. Theft under 76-6-412 UCA, a Class "B"
misdemeanor;
2.
Illegal
Possession
of
Alcohol
under
n
32A-12-13 UCA, a Class "B misdemeanor and 3. Interferance
with a Police Officer under 76-8-305 UCA, a Class "B"
misdemeanor. Defendant was released on his own recognizance.
The Sheriff illegally refused to release the
Defendant; stating that he intended to file even more
charges. The undersigned then contacted Judge Perry of the
First Circuit Court in Logan, who verbally ordered the
release of the Defendant upon the posting of one thousand
dollars in bail.
On November 1, 1989, the County Attorney filed a
Motion to Transfer, which Judge Cox, the JP, signed November
4, 1988. On November 22, 1988, the County Attorney filed an
Information charging Defendant with:
1. Retail Theft, under 76-6-602 UCA, a Class "B"
misdemeanor;
2. Unlawful Possession of Alcohol under 32A-12-13
UCA, a Class "B" misdemeanor (the only charge not changed)
3. Assault on a Police Officer under 76-5-102.4
UCA, a Class "A" misdemeanor. The last charge is not only
different as to the elements of the offense, and one
calculated to prejudice the jury, because it alleges a
physical attack on the Sheriff, but it imposes a much more
potent penalty.

9.

Two of the three changes noted are obviously in
violation of Rule 4 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, quoted
infra. Both changes are "different charges", and obviously,
changing from the Interfering charge to the Assault charge
would prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant.
POINT III.
DEFENDANT WAS • ILLEGALLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT
FOR A MISDEMEANOR ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED OUT OF THE OFFICER'S
PRESENCE.
The Defendant was arrested by the Sheriff at the
Harding Haven cabin some two hours following an alleged
shoplifting incident at the Old Rock Store. The officer did
not have a warrant for the arrest of defendant, and in fact
the defendant was not even in the store when the alleged
incident occurred. (Suppression Hearing Transcript P 8-9)
77-7-1 UCA defines
"arrest", as an "Actual
Restraint", and allows no more use of force than is
necessary to effectuate the restraint.
77-7-2 UCA allows a peace officer to arrest
without a Warrant, only if the offense is committed in his
presence, or if it is felony which the officer has
reasonable cause to believe was committed by defendant.
In this case, the sheriff knew that at least one
of the boys had not even been in the store when the alleged
shoplifting occurred. He arrested defendant solely on the
report of the shopkeeper. (Trans, of Motion to Suppress,
pp.51,52,53,54) . The sheriff admitted that at the time he
told the defendant "come with me", the defendant was in
custody.(P 53.).
The sheriff attempts to buttress his position with
the assertion that he could smell alcohol on the breath of

10.
the defendant, but it is noteable that he refused to give a
requested breath test to really find out who was telling the
truth. (Trial Trans, p.182) What the sheriff wants to do is
quickly skip over the illegal arrest, and try to find some
other basis for an arrest, ie. an alleged smell of alcohol,
and an unopened can of beer, but those pieces of evidence,
are tainted by the fact that there was no warrant for
arrest, and evidence illegally obtained is not admissible to
justify a false arrest. Chimel V. California 395 U.S. 752;
89 S.Ct. 2034: 23 L.Ed. 2d 685. The first prerequisite is
that the officer is lawfully present, and that he is within
parameters of the Arrest statute. 77-7-2 UCA.
Sheriff
Cockayne was not, his arrest of the defendant is defective,
and subsequent patching on of illegally obtained evidence
should be prevented by this court as a protection guaranteed
by the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution and Article 1
section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUPPRESSING ILLEGALLY
OBTAINED EVIDENCE, OBTAINED WITHOUT A SEARCH WARRANT.
Closely related to the question of lawfullness of
a Warrantless Arrest, is the question of Illegal Search and
Siezure.
Defendant made a timely motion under Rule 12, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, to suppress all evidence
obtained pursuant to both an unlawful arrest, with out
warrant, and an unlawful Search and Siezure, effected
without a Search Warrant. The ruling of Judge Perry is
found on P. 66 of the Transcript of the Motion to Suppress.
The Court confuses the law.

Said Judge Perry:

11.
Testimony of the—Mrs.Early establishes reasonable
cause for believing that the persons had committed
a public offense, even though not in the officer's
presence. Section 77-13-3 (sic, apparently meant
77-7-2) provides that where an officer has
reasonable cause and he thinks that it's possible
that the persons may destroy or conceal evidence
of the commission of the offense or flee the
jurisdiction, he can make the arrest before a
warrant may be obtained. *
That statement of the court
is in itself,
reverseable error. The court confuses .probable cause as a
basis for ignoring the requirement for a Warrant.
The
officer, in order to make a lawful arrest, must have both
probable cause, and a warrant, or to have been present when
the alledged offense occurred. (State vs. Mendoza , 748 P.2d
181) . Probable cause is not a substitute for either the
warrant, or the officer's presence at the scene. The Fourth
Amendment
to
the
U.S.
Constitution
requires
..."no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be siezed."
The Judge tries to justify his manifest error, by
throwing in the gratuitous proposition that if the officer
has reasonable cause to think that the defendant may either
destroy
the evidence, or
conceal
it, or
flee
the
jurisdiction, that the officer can make the arrest without
warrant. It is noteable that the prosecution did not say
one word about such exception to the Warrant requirement,
nor did any witness. The sheriff did in fact obtain a
warrant, very quickly from Justice of the Peace Cox, it was
signed by the Justice at 3:44 PM, after the boys had all
been arrested, and transported to Jail. (Trans, of Motion to
Suppress, pp 60, 61).
The sheriff had claimed to the boys that he did
not need a search or arrest warrant, (Transcript of Motion
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to Suppress, p 43; Trial Transcript p. 260.
The Utah Supreme Court delineated

the need

for a

specific Search Warrant, in State vs. Gallegos, 712 P2d 2(17,
and declared that the decision as to what may be siezed, and
what

may

not,

administrative

is

a

judicial

(eg. by

the

decision,

sheriff),

as

See

P

opposed

to

209, headnote

2-3, and footnote 8.
The

purpose

against

unlawful

privacy

and

law

searches

personal

enforcement

for

the
and

rights

prohibition

siezures, is to protect

of

from

case

point

defendant, not even present

when

the

investigated,

just

because the Officer makes a self

is

serving

is

by

illustration, an innocent
being

in

intrusion

good

crime

The

citizens

the

a

alleged

officers.

Constitutional

arrested,

decision

that he

has reasonable cause, and does not therefore need a Warrant
from

a

judge.

Because

the

lower

court

did

not

properly

protect that innocent young defendants rights, a jury finds
the

defendant

guilty,

not

only

obviously did not commit, but

of

the

two others

crime

which

he

flowing

from

it.

The jury even finds defendant guilty of Assaulting a Police
officer, when the obvious fact is that the officer illegally
assaulted the defendant.
A search, without warrant, or Search Warrant, is
illegal; even
of

beer,

is

incriminating
tainted,

evidence, like an unopened

when

lawfully on the premises.

as

here,

the

officer

is

The officer's selfserving

can
not

claims

that he entered with permission, totally refuted by the four
boys, will not redeem the original unlawful entry, nor make
valid, the

illegally

siezed

evidence.

(Gallegos, infra, p.

211.)
The sheriff, after
unopened can of beer.

entering

the

cabin,

found

an

He noted that the boys disavowed any

knowledge of the beer.(Trans, of Motion to Suppress, p.57).
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The explanation for the beer being found in the cabin was
supplied by Sandra Harding, see Trial Transcript, pp 322-323,
which left the sheriff with no evidence of shoplifting, of
any kind, which would justify the arrest of Defendant. Even
the pretextual search of the cabin, after the sheriff did
obtain a Search Warrant, failed to produce any of the
supposedly stolen 12 pack of Milwaukee's Best Beer, or the
package, or any cans, empty or full. (See copy of the Search
Warrant, and affidavit of Sheriff Cockayne, obviously based
on heresay, which turns out to be false, Addendum #8.)
There was no basis for the court finding that
there were "Exigent circumstances11, justifying warrantless
entry into the cabin, (see Oregon vs. Roberts, 706 P2d 564;)
since no evidence was even introduced on the subject, it was
improper for the judge to throw away defendants constitutional rights in such a fashion.
See also, State V. Hygh 711 P2d 265, discussing
the fruitlessness of an after the fact search made with a
Search Warrant, "a mere pretext" ( p. 267,268.) to try to
cover up the original unlawful search and seizure.
POINT V:
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT OVERTURNING A CONVICTION
WHEN THE EVIDENCE WAS SO LACKING AND UNSUBSTANTIAL THAT
REASONABLE MEN COULD NOT REACH A VERDICT OF GUILTY BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT.
There has already been ample discussion of the
fact that the prime witness, Renee Early, proprietor of the
Old Rock Store, exculpated this defendant, saying that he
was not even present when the alleged shoplifting occurred.
Defendant filed a timely Motion to Dismiss Count
II, Retail Theft, after Mrs. Early's testimony, which the
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court turned down, on the theory that the Prosecution might
produce
some
evidence
that
the
Defendant
might
be
implicated. None was ever produced, the Defendants motion
should have been granted. The sheriff himself admitted
having no evidence of Aiding and Abetting, (Trial Transcript
p.140.)
Likewise, with respect to Count I Assault Against
Police Officer on duty, there was evidence that until the
officer slapped a handcuff on the Defendant, he had been
totally cooperative (Trial Transcript, p. 143). The officer
had complete control of the situation, he could, if he had
completed his investigation before becoming physical, have
determined that the unopened can of beer had been left by
Mrs. Sandra Harding, and that it was not part of the 12 pack
allegedly stolen from the Old Rock Store.
Instead, the officer elected to use force and
violence far beyond what was called for. He cuffed the
defendant, threw him down on a bed and tried to forcefully
handcuff defendant. That does not add up to evidence of an
Assault on a Police Officer; it might be Interferance, if
the Officer was effecting a lawful arrest, but he was trying
to arrest the wrong person. (See the rules as to quantum of
evidence required to exclude every reasonable doubt other
than the defendants guilt, State vs. Lamm, 606 P2d 229;
State vs. John, 586 P2d 410, 411.
It is interesting that in the separate
actions
against the other boys, that all charges were dropped
against Shane Miller, age 15; the other 15 year old, Lee
Ellis was acquitted of the charges of Shoplifing and
Assault, and was found guilty only of Interfering.
The
other 18 year old, Mark LeFevre was charged with five
offenses. He had a prior record, so was coerced thru the
multiplicity of charges, into plea bargaining to avoid going

15.
to prison.
He plead guilty to the shoplifting charge,
(notwithstanding the total lack of physical evidence of any
such offense), and Interfering. Only this defendant, the
one who was palpably innocent of the original shoplifting
charge, has been found guilty of all three offenses.
The ruling of the Circuit Court, upholding an
obviously biased decision of the Jury is a miscarriage of
Justice, which it is incumbent on this court to correct.
SUMMARY:
1. The defendant should, in order to have received
a fair trial, have had his Motion for Change of Venue
granted. Six jurors, all living in the same or adjoining
town where everybody knows everybody, with the sheriff, who
obviously knew, and were either fearful of or loyal to the
Sheriff,
found
defendant
guilty
on
such
thin
and
unsubstantial evidence, that no reasonable man could find,
on that evidence, that Defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
2. The County, obviously sure of it's ability to
convict defendant, proceeded
to "throw the book" at
defendant; charging him initially with three Class "B"
misdemeanors, and then amending by the Information, to
charge two Class "B" offenses, and one Class "A", This
crass violation of Rule 4, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
exposed Defendant to additional and more serious punishment,
an obvious violation of the Rule.
3. The Sheriff's arrest of Defendant for shoplifting was a classic violation of the Arrest statutes. The
offense, a misdemeanor, occurred outside the officers
presence; the arrest was without warrant. Picking the one
obviously innocent boy of the four illustrates why Warrants
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of Arrest are required, to avoid punishment of the
guiltless, based on the officer's inadequate knowledge of
the facts.
4. A warrantless search and siezure turned up only
one unopened can of beer, which subsequent facts proved
without doubt, belonged to a previous user of the cabin, not
to defendant. The officer's unwarranted invasion of the
privacy of defendant and others should have resulted in
suppression of the evidence, which would have obviated an
unjust verdict.
5. The presumption of innocence, requires that a
defendant be convicted of a crime only when the evidence is
sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime
has occurred. This case is the result of bias on the part
of a jury, influenced by a sheriff with a reputation for
hasseling teens. The evidence should have resulted in a
verdict of not guilty, failing which the Court should have
granted relief.
This multiplicity of errors by the court, in all
justice needs to be reversed by the Court of Appeals.
Respectfully submitted this 4th of October, 1989.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE:
I hereby certify that I mailed ten copies of the
foregoing Defendants Brief to the Clerk of the Utah Court of
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84102; and two copies to George w. Preston, Rich
County Attorney, attorney for Respondent, 31 Federal Avenue,
Ogden, Utah 84321, postage prepaid, in the U.S. Mail, this
4th of October, 1989.
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The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Richard Alien BRADSHAW, Defendant

and Appellant.
No. 14060.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct. 16, 1975.
Defendant was convicted in the Fifth
District Court, Beaver County, J. Harlan
Burns, J., of intentionally interfering with
a law enforcement official seeking to effect an arrest, and he appealed. The Supreme Courtfl&^JJ^J^Jitld that the statute under which defendant was convicted
was unconstitutionally vague.
Reversed and remanded for dismissal.
Henriod, C. J., filed a concurring opinion.
Ellett and Crockett, JJ., dissented and
filed separate opinions.
Criminal Law <S=>13-1(2)
Statute making any
a misdemeanor when he
terferes with a * * *
official seeking to effect
tention of himself * *

person guilty of
"intentionally inlaw enforcement
an arrest or de*^f^^gjWrof

TUCKETT, Justice:
After a trial de novo in the district court,
defendant was found guilty of violating
Sec. 76-8-305, U.C.A.1953, as amended,
which reads as follows :
A person is guilty of a class B niisde^
mtmm when he intentionally interferes*
JpPl: person recognized to be a law eniofcement official seeking to effect an
arrest or detention of himself or another
xegardless of whether there is a legal
haj^Jftc^fec arrest:
The defendant was sentenced to serve six
months in the county jail. From the verdict and sentence the defendant has appealed claiming that the statute above referred to is invalid on constitutional
grounds.
The complainant is a policeman of Milford City, Beaver County, Utah, who observed the defendant driving an automobile
on the streets of that city. The officer followed the defendant to a service station
where he informed the defendant that he
was going to issue the defendant a citation
for driving while his driver's license was
suspended. After the defendant had completed the purchase of gasoline he drove
away from the service station a short distance to a hotel where he resided. The officer followed the defendant in a patrol
car with the siren going. At the hotel, the

|t7e|i>r r%J^V K~ g"^j^+ to various meanings
and interpretations, fails to inform ordinary citizen who is seeking to obey the
laws as to conduct sought to be proscribed,
and ^ h e r e f o ^ S Vncoqatitiitional as pMi*&B3jfmfat
without
^rsi^k^JSm^wA
I^^Jaw^Lj^i^-C.A.1953,
7^
305; Const, art. 1, § 14; U.S.C.A.Const.
Amend. 4.

Michael W. Park, Cedar City, for defendant-appellant.
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Earl F.
Dorius, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City,
John O. Christiansen, Beaver County
Atty., Beaver, for plaintiff-respondent.

dele53aTrF"Was operating an automobile during suspension was untrue, and the defendant did in fact have a valid driver's license.
It is doubtful whether or not the record
supports the conviction of the defendant
inasmuch as the officer made no effort

AVi>&-Diw( *7
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to take custody of the defendant, and it is
doubtful whether or not the act of the defendant in simply ignoring the officer is
an interference with him. On appeal we
are only concerned, however, with the defendant's challenge to the statute. In passing we point out that the officer accused
the defendant of violation of the Motor
Vehicle Code, and the provisions of that
code should have been followed by the officer in dealing with the purported violation. The provisions of Sec. 41-6-166, U.
C.A. 1953, are controlling in situations similar to the one herein. A pertinent part
of that section is as follows:

warrant shall issue but upon probabfe"
cause supported by oath or affirmation*
particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
While the particular problem raised has
not been before this court, the &ngnage
pf, the Utah Constitution was taken verblimmd uui the langtiage ~ef* ttcr-Fottrtfc
TOffendment to the jEqiSficStion of the
UataA-Jfcrtear^
States Supreme Court in dealing with the particular
problem in the case of Terry v. Ohio,1 at
page 16 of the U. S. Reports, 88 S.Ct. at
page 1877 had this to say: "It is quite plain
that the Fourth Amendment covers 'seizures' of the person which do not eventuate
in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime—'arrests' in traditional terminology. It must be recognized thafWhe**
«erer a police officer accosts an individual
and restrains his freedom to walk away,
he has 'seized1 that person.1* Tterr*Case
went on to hold that arrests without a warrant may only be made upon probable cause.
Other decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court
are to the same effect.2

Whenever any person is arrested for
any violation of this act punishable as
a misdemeanor, the arrested person shall
be immediately taken before a magistrate
within the county in which the offense
charged is alleged to have been committed and who has jurisdiction of such
offense and is nearest or most accessible
with reference to the place where said
arrest is made, in any of the following
cases:
(1) When a person arrested demands
an immediate appearance before a magThe language of the particular statute
istrate.
we
are here dealing with is undoubtedly
*
*
*
*
*
*
subject to the constitutional challenge of
(4) In any other event when the per- vagueness. That part of the statute "reson arrested refuses to give his written gardless of whether there is a legal basis
promise to appear in court as hereinafter for the arrest" may be subject to various
provided, or when in the discretion of the meanings and interpretations.
arresting officer, a written promise to
appear is insufficient.
rdtia€& by incarceration be
On appeal the defendant contends that
t
mt w i U
^ S ^ subminG"**!*^
the statute under which he was charged " nfBftdSi—
and convicted is invalid in view of the pro- Same is m vtoiatioirgti*^
an|
rea
W^^^^0L^^ch
<*s a s follows:
»Ikft ffcght^of the people to be secure
is their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures j | | j i j ^ ^
no

1. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868,
20 L.Ed.2d 889.
2. Henry v. U. S.f 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168,
4 L.Ed^d 134; Wong Sun v. U. S., 371 U.S.
541 PJZd—51

^^atJllillllMIMipiMI ••HI i w l TfHi
arrarj^
cause and witife
6 u l E l w & - % ^ , l o r the- frfrcssUyLikewise
th»-WIK^ ^falttlfet'es^ ar treed in the statute withtftrt further definition or elabora*
471, 83 S.Ct 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441; Wright v.
Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 83 S.Ct. 1240, 10 L.
Ed.2d 349; People v. Curtis, 70 Cal.2d 347,
74 Cal.Rptr. 713, 450 P.2d 33.
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tion may mean any protest or verbal remonstration with an officer as well as the employment of physical force to avoid an arrest. We are of the opinion that the language of the statute as above pointed out
fails to inform an ordinary citizen who is
seeking to obey the laws as to the conduct
sought to be proscribed. H n JtHMW in i W
gai"ticiiUi^*«bovc referred to is in violator*
of the Constitution of this State and the
United States and therefore invalid.

t h ( ^ l f e » * a w ! 5 g i « 5 jfistoi—necessary

rges, that the
circumstanceo i, trf*yTa9^ffl€^havr"'nc^ing

^rf^SSmTXi

h7mmS23$r do with

th*«««*liuu ul UlilMffTO
«te applicable to the facts and basic issue
here. They had a lot to do with Hitlerism,
This matter is reversed and remanded to and in my opinion, the subject statute conthe district court to dismiss the complaint. ceivably may be knocking at the door of
some such eventuality. In such case^jgii*
fer w j t l } i r 4 » i ^ ^ W ^
concurs.
t ^ i S r ^ K c r f n a t the pre^afffffO^f^stimpIIT7\TT> T/"\T"\
ti Justice (concurring), ^mrh^ttskvo^
of constitutionality justilymmmmmm^
rc6ncur,~the while conceding that this irlg~a six-month sCTCtdi iy^aiy-^JnjgQ^o^k^
may be a close case, and that the argu*^*'
im&tirt
*srafutT ffiaT^fHrtieafcin'
ments of the dissents about law and order arrest of a citizen by a "recognized" law
and the integrity of the constabulary, are enforcement officer, popularly looked uppeals of optimism for a desired socio-politi- on as a person in a blue, brass-buttoned
cal community. Nonetheless, I am con- suit, ornamented with a silver star over his
vinced that they have neglected the liberty heart (but who may be an imposter in rentbell, whose chimes presumably reach the ed garb), which citizen is minding his own
ears not only of the shackler but the shack- business, a a ^ ^ * ^
lee, and presumably reflect each's constitu- er
tional prerogative of equality,—the hall- ^^^m^fHem
*f whether there is a
mark of which is reasonableness. I take ^ M J ^ ^ 4 ^ I4i mvttt m not, as was th^
it that any set of circumstances that outdistances such sounds might be said to In such case, the presumption in favor of
constitute a journey out of the realm of
constitutionality successfully is rebutted,
constitutionality as we understand it.
and as generally is the rule, disappears, and
In this case the officer in the first instance said he was going to issue the defendant a citation for driving while his license was suspended. He did not arrest
him, or threaten him with an arrest. Millions of citations are issued daily without
an arrest. The defendant did not object
to a citation, nor did he resist an arrest at
that time, but drove away a short distance
followed by the officer, who arrested him,
claiming he resisted arrest,—not borne out
by the facts. 1

the presumption of innocence that always
attends a defendant, destroys the former,
the latter to persist. Facts well may be
instrumental in its persistence.

I. One of the dissents suggests that we must
ignore the facts, they being the function of
the jury. Another suggestion seems apropos
that without the facts, the unconstitutionality
of a statute is a subject only of a declaratory

judgement that ignores the fact of constitutional right of liberty.

The dissents say there is no constitutional
question here since there is no search
and seizure problem involved. The main
opinion points to Terry v. Ohio 2 and other
authorities 3 that seem to disagree,—which
authorities have my preference over such
unsupported generality.

2. Footnote 1, main opinion.
3. Footnote 2, main opinion.
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I respectfully disagree with the gratuifv ever except to touch his fellow, tawu-sawkfi*
1
in one of the dissents to the effect th^ an officer, and actually walke4 JU*«P • f• mn'
'Nowhere in the statute can it be iouxfi an inaide&tJ&al the office* *•***, ~ « w
that an unreasonable arrest is permitted ^r ated.
The facts and hypothetics recited here
encouraged." I suggest the subject statu*e
both permits and encourages an nmtdiSQ^" are not for the purpose of deciding this
abie~|g^^toj^ wmmmmm^^sm9^ case on the facts, which one of the dissents
ihwfl&Ht iiiSwrimm mift* erroneously said we could do, but to demwheniTMysit
WSS& rDnstrate the vagueness of the statute, and
the door it opens ostensibly, on a pretext
of false constitutionality, to events leading
;to an unconstitutional invasion of the constitutional right against unreasonable seizure, a guaranteed right of privacy and a
"constitutional assurance of right of free locomotion and freedom from harassment and
that riw^-statu^ incarceration,—all in virtue of a statute
seems by implication or legerdemain, to V* that Me^s^^^a^idkiulous discrimination m
an arbitrary exercise of poor judgment ^ll^ji^£iMiJHll^€eiiient official and
but in doing so interferes with an office*"* a^uft^?,wn,i^rihwiiile law-abiding citizen
—it costs him six months deprivation 0* wfwJ^P#^1a!t1Si|ClLffie expense of
and wtjffiiffiiSrs^ the illegal
his liberty.
,___,.„
^ officiaT;jf*To me this
4Sas up to an Eleventh Commandment, to
pgo hence and defy the law hiding behind
bt badge, and let him who is without sin,
4ut interferes in the lawlessness, to serve
4 W sentence.

_ipp,.._

as sheriffs, deputies, city policemen, to^n
policemen, school crossing guards, constablee
town marshals, judges of various hues, ga^
wardens, treasury agents, tax collectors, ca**1"
pus policemen, truant officers, forest range*"0'
justices of the peace, district court judge0»
Supreme Court Justices, sanitarians, agric^*"
tural agents, special police, meter maids, etc"
ad infinitum.
Utah Rep 533-542 P 2d—27

fc^eems to me to be somewhat of a departure from reality and practicality and
^ven morality to say a statute is constitutional that says one person can violate the
law and by virtue of such illegal act induce
another to indulge in a confrontation which
he did not seek and get six months because
a possible tormenter, acting illegally, goaded him into it. It is a rather superficial
answer to say, as do the dissenters here,
that having perhaps unwittingly "interfered" in an arrest, with the sometimes
ludicrous and chameleonic meaning that

notation so vague as to render a statute unconstitutional, in my opinion. Does one interfere with an officer if he heckles him, refuses
to leave the scene of a demonstration in which
a person is being arrested, is a curiosity
seeker at a fire where a suspected arsonist is
being apprehended, a physician attempting to
administer to a dying man who is being arrested, etc.?
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someone "might" attach to the word, the
"interferer," acting in good faith, not having read this funny statute, should be content to lose his job, his good name in the
community, his liberty for six months, and
his respect for the establishment, in exchange for the great privilege of hiring a
lawyer, going to court to seek damages
(which are no substitute for loss of freedom),—all because one of the countless
hordes of law enforcement officials not only committed a pediculous, but illegal rip-off
in making what is worse,
^m^^^^
person_^^^><5^a»Mj^^ JUflf^arr p*%jh%£
Scratic legislation in a free
society, could resist arrest, and who as of
now, can resist arrest if it happens to be
classified as a citizen's arrest.
This statute does not have any semblance
of a reasonable, constitutional statute prefaced by a warning requirement of some
kind, a reasonable request that the citizen
show something, or that under the circumstances "probable cause" appears to justify
an arrest, or "that there is reason to believe an offense has been or is about to
be committed."
One of the dissents asserts that it appears that the majority "is influenced by
the facts of the case and seeks an impermissible way to correct what it considers a
bad verdict." Although this statement may
be permissible gratuity as to others in the
majority triumvirate, it is not so as to this
author, jsince.

chi

iwflMtftfetettflfa^^

townsman

Orie^atailf^^
i t J M f l f i W g f t HHBbTit to him. It is
suggested that the dissent "is at some pains"
to explain why the officer did not do one
of the things mentioned above, QE*sSjdH
threat^^CiW -4ri<iiJB«^ M W W B S ^ S
0M**M+"<iv£rr he- ccimiitted- a 'bre^di of
flN^fteacenif the process of what pro¥c4»tQ
ven^om gjt»^ik^-#»<? dlssente both say was
the very purpose of the statute they say is
salutary in keeping the peace.
In passing, it is noted that neither of the
dissents cites any authority that really supports the rule provided in the statute here.
One, Miller v. State, a 1969 Alaska case
(462 P.2d 421), at first blush would seem
to. It may be pointed out, however, that
the court there laid down a rule of law
having no codification, which was similar
to the provisions of our statute, saying that
at least one state court had recommended
such a rule as a matter of its common law
development, being State v. Koonce, 89
NJ.Super. 169, 214 A.2d 428, 1965,—an intermediate court but not the court of last
resort, the New Jersey Supreme Court.
However, the Miller case, supra, pulled
its punches on any constitutionality question, which was not even raised in the case,
jvhen it said "It should be noted that the
nilcwefonn^^

^^j^mmmmmmm^m^^imm
the dissents suggests that The
main opinion is at some pains to explain
how the police officer could have handled
this apparently arrogant and belligerent
defendant in a different manner." It does
not take much imagination to answer that
question.
6. Two other cases cited in the dissent, Rosenberg v. State, and State v. Byrne, are Florida
cases decided in Appellate Division Courts, inferior courts not having the authoritative

t&^m^^hmmm

to

in-

be * peace officer.

(^fe'iiaAofeffpiuTirLiiTs-arc then present."
On the strength of such hedging, it is suggested that this case, the only one cited in
the dissent, certainly would be undispositive
in an attack on a statute's constitutionality
on the ground of vagueness.6
weight of the Florida Supreme Court, having
the same subordinate stature of State v.
Koonce, supra.
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I am of the opinion the statute cannot
stand a true test of constitutionality based
either on a claim of 1) vagueness or 2) unreasonable seizure.

ant is entitled to bail in a reasonable
amount. 3 Besides the statute does not prevent resistance to an unlawful arrest when
made by a private person. It only applies
to arrests made by a known police officer.

E L L E T T , Justice (dissenting).

By both our constitution 4 and statute, 5
#le ruling of the district court in cases apannot agree that the statute pealed from a justice of the peace court is
ftouftt&N**'
Ty*To the provision of our constitu- final except as to cases involving the contion. It does not permit an unlawful seiz- stitutionality of a statute. 6 This matter is
ure (arrest). It merely transfers the right such a case, and so we must limit our reof redress for a wrongful arrest to the or- view to the determination of whether the
derly procedure of a court trial instead of
statute is invalid. We may not review the
a brawl in the streets. 1
facts of the case.
The question of lawfulness of an arrest
It appears that the prevailing opinion is
may be a close one, and a brawl may result influenced by the facts of the case and
in a killing. The legislature was wise in seeks an impermissible way to correct what
passing the statute in question in the in- it considers a bad verdict.
terest of maintaining order and preventing
That is the function of the trial court—
confrontations which might lead to bloodshed. Nowhere in the statute can it be not that of an appellate tribunal. If we
found that an unreasonable seizure (ar- wish to be jurors, we should renounce our
rest) is permitted or encouraged. There is position as justices and wait until our
no change in the law that one making an hames are drawn for jury service.
unlawful arrest must answer for it, and
so there is no basis for saying the statute
conflicts with the Constitution.

In reviewing a statute to ascertain its
Constitutionality, certain rules of construction must be applied:

The common law gave a person the right
to resist an unlawful arrest, but times have
changed since the time when self-help was
permitted to prevent a wrongful arrest.
At common law, arrests were often made
by citizens. Judges were not available for
speedy release on bond, and trials were long
delayed. Such conditions no longer exist.

(a) A legislative enactment is presumed
to be valid and in conformity with the constitution. 7

mm
pot ht

^"^m

I. Milter v. State, 462 P.2d 421, 426 (Alaska
1969) ; Rosenberg v. State, 264 So.2d 68;
State v. Byrne, 311 So.2d 764; See Annotation in 44 A.L.R. 3rd at p. 1087 for cases
holding it a crime to resist a known officer
when making an arrest even absent a statute
like ours.
3. Art. I, Sec. 9, Utah Const.

(b) It should not be held to be invalid unless it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt
to be incompatible with some particular
Constitutional provision. 8
(c) The burden of showing invalidity
§f an ordinance or statute is upon the one
Vho makes the challenge. 9
§. Eureka City v. Wilson, 15 Utah 53, 48 P.
41, affd. 173 U.S. 32, 19 S.Ct. 317, 43 L.Ed.
603 (1897) ; State v. Iloltgreve, 58 Utah 563,
200 P. 894, 26 A.L.R. 696 (1921) ; American
Fork City v. Robinson, 11 Utah 168, 292 P.
249 (1930).
7. Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers,
Inc., 21 Utah 2d 431, 446 P.2d 958 (1968) ;
Snow v. Keddington, 113 Utah 325, 195 P.2d
234 (1948).

4. Art. VIII, Sec. 9, Utah Const.

ft. Cases cited note 1 supra.

5. Sec. 78-3-5, U.OA.1953.

9. Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers,
Inc., supra note 7.
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In the case of State v. Packardia it was
said:
It is recognized that statutes should not
be declared unconstitutional if there is
any reasonable basis upon which they may
be sustained as falling within the constitutional framework [citations omitted], and that a statute will not be held
void for uncertainty if any sort of sensible, practical effect may be given it.
[Citations omitted].
The Supreme Court of the United States
in Roth v. U. S.11 said:
. . . This Court, however, has consistently held that lack of precision is
not itself offensive to the requirement
of due process. ". . . [T]he Constitution does not require impossible
standards"; all that is required is that
the language "conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct
when measured by common understanding and practices . . . " United
States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8, 67 S.
Ct. 1538,91 L.Ed. 1877.
The case of Sunset Amusement Co, v.
Board of Police Commissioners of City of
Los Angelesu is in point:

stitutional requirements [of due process
of law] it is not necessary that it furnishes detailed plans and specifications
of the acts or conduct prohibited."
The author of the prevailing opinion apparently doubts that the statute violates the
constitutional provision regarding unreasonable seizures as claimed by the appellant. He seems to buttress the decision on
the constitutional challenge of vagueness.
This claim is personal to the author of the
opinion, and was not raised either at trial
or on appeal.
I can see nothing vague about the language of the statute in question. Any person of ordinary intelligence should know
that when a known officer is making, or
attempting to make, an arrest, self-help or
lay interference is prohibited by the law.
In my opinion the statute is not unconstitutional, and we are duty bound to so
say and to affirm the judgment.
CROCKETT, Justice (dissenting).
With due respect to our disagreeing colleagues, I am impelled to state that the majority opinion impresses me as a strained
effort to cast the statute in a light different
from its true intent and meaning for the
purpose of making it appear to be unconstitutional and striking it down. It is my
judgment that such a ruling is contrary to
sound principles of law and considerations
of policy. In addition to the cogent and
correct observations of Justice Ellett, including : that a legislative enactment should
not be so nullified unless it is violative of
some constitutional provision beyond a reasonable doubt, I offer some further comments.

. It should be kept in mind
that there are an infinite variety of activities or conduct which could result in
potential or actual danger to the "peace,
health, safety, convenience, good morals,
and general welfare" of the public. A
municipality cannot reasonably be expected to isolate and specify those precise
activities or conduct which are intended
to be proscribed. As stated in Daniel
[Daniel v. Board of Police Com'rs, 190
Cal.App2d 566, 12 Cal.Rptr. 226] quoting
from an earlier case, "To make a statute
sufficiently certain to comply with con-

First, I re-emphasize that this statute
does not authorize a peace officer to make

10. 122 Utah 369, 373, 250 P.2d 561, 563
(1952).

12. 7 Cal.3d 64, 101 Cal.Rptr. 768, 773, 496
P.2d 840, 845 (1972).

Ill 354 U.S. 476, 491, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1312
lL.Ed.2d 1498 (1956).
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an unlawful arrest. Nor does it authorize
the seizure of any person or property. It
does not deal with when or under what circumstances the lawful arrest may be made.
That subject is dealt with elsewhere in the
law.1 Neither does it in any way adversely affect or deprive any person who is subjected to an improper or unlawful arrest
of any right or remedy he has always had
under the law. It seems inescapably plain
to me that the sole purpose of this statute
is to safeguard against interference with a
peace officer who is attempting to make
an arrest, to the end that violence may be
avoided.
This statute may be different than you
or I, or the other justices of this court may
desire it to be, or would have drafted it,
had that been their responsibility. But I
certainly do not think it is beyond the realm
of rationality to see it as the expressed will
of the people of this State, acting through
their legislature, that when any duly authorized peace officer is 'attempting to
make an arrest, no citizen should interfere
with him. If the arrest proves to be improper or unlawful, whoever is aggrieved
thereby is not without the remedies the law
gives him, both in that case if it comes to
court, and/or in another if he wants to sue.
All this statute does is to make it a misdemeanor if he presumes to judge the lawfulness of the arrest, and interferes with
the officer in the performance of his duty.
In considering whether it is within the
power of the state legislature to enact such
a statute it is important to have in mind
that, as contrasted to the federal government, which has only those powers expressly granted to it, the legislature of this State
has all of the powers of sovereignty, except only as expressly limited or prohibited
I. See Title 77, Ch. 13, Utah Code Ann.1953.
Z. To avoid repetition on this subject here,
see statement in Wood v. Budge, 13 Utah 2d

by the constitution.2 It therefore has the
power to enact any law or regulation calculated to preserve the peace and good order of the citizenry, unless some constitutional provision prohibits it.
The provision of our Constitution quoted
and relied on as nullifying the statute is
Section 14, Article I, relating to searches
and seizures. It is submitted that if that
section is considered in its total context,
as rules of construction require, it will be
seen that the purpose of that section is in
accordance with its title "Unreasonable
searches forbidden—Issuance of warrant";
and that it is dealing with the invasion of
privacy by unreasonable searches and seizures of persons, houses, papers and effects
and when the issuance of a warrant is
necessary for that purpose, and not with
the matter of making an arrest of the nature involved here. I therefore do not see
how that constitutional provision can properly be regarded as preventing the legislature from enacting a peace and good order
statute such as the one in question, nor
how it has any application to the situation
dealt with in this case.
We should look at the composite of this
fact situation in a light supportive of the
jury verdict, approved by the trial court
in his denial of motion to set it aside. But,
let it be conceded that the police officer
may have been mistaken concerning the defendant's having a revoked driver's license.
The main opinion is at some pains to explain how the police officer could have
handled this apparently arrogant and insolent defendant in a different manner. It
wholly ignores the proposition that if this
defendant had not been a person of that
disposition, and if he had a valid driver's
license on him as the law requires, he could
359, 374 P.2d 516, and authorities therein
cited.

808

Utah

541 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

have avoided any difficulty for himself
or the police officer by simply so stating
and exhibiting the license. But he chose
the contrary course which resulted in the
difficulty in which he finds himself.

The STATEjfrf Utah, Plaintiff

and Respondent,
v.
Lewis A. BANJKS, Jr., Defendant

and Appellant.
I cannot see it as consistent with my judicial duty in the light of what I regard
as correct principles of law and sound policy
to align myself with the position of this
defendant who obviously manifests a disposition to flout the law and authority, and
place the burden of exemplary behavior
on the peace officer who is trying to enforce and uphold it. It is my impression
that, quite different from the view taken
by the jurors and the trial judge, the possibility exists that some members of the
court may view the fact situation in this
case as offensive to their sense of justice.
If this be so, and the ends of justice require overturning the verdict, this court
could very well do so by deciding that the
peace officer was wrong and that #there
was no justification for finding that the
defendant was "interfering" with the peace
officer making an arrest. I could not agree
with that solution, beiieving that to be the
prerogative of the jury and the trial court.
But in my judgment that would be a solution more nearly rational and in conformity
with proper judicial function and prerogative than to strike the statute down to rectify one seemingly harsh case. This would
also be in harmony with the well-established principle of constitutional law: that
the court should not declare a statute unconstitutional if the case can be decided on
other grounds.3
In any event, it should be indicated that
it is unconstitutional only as applied when
a person resists arrest as to himself or his
family, and not remove its effect from other situations where its salutary purpose
should be preserved.

Noll 13996.

Supreme tourt of Utah.
Octj2, 1975.

Defendant wafc convicted after trial by
jury in the Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Gordon Ej. Hall, J., of aggravated
assault. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court held \that it was not error to
admit into evidence a pistol which had
been seized in closet proximity to where defendant was arrester! and which was sufficiently similar to thi gun used that gun admitted into evidence could serve for illustrative purposes.
Affirmed.
1. Criminal Law <3=>4<W4)

In prosecution wherein defendant was
convicted of aggravated assault, it was not
error to admit into evidence pistol which
had been seized in \ close proximity to
where defendant was larrested and which
was sufficiently similar to gun used that
gun admitted into evidence could serve for
illustrative purposes. JU.C.A.1953, 76-5102(1)(c), 76-5-103(1) ft), (2).
2. Searches and Seizures ^3.3(5)
Where gun was fojund in close proximity to where defendant was arrested, officers had right to takje it for their own
protection.

Jack W. Kunkler, Skit Lake Legal Defender Assn., Salt Lak£ City for defendant
and appellant.
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Earl F.
Dorius, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City
for plaintiff and respondent.

3. See Heathman v. Giles, 18 Utah 2d 368, 374 P.2d 839; 16 Am.Jur.2d 301.
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Appellant,
v.
Adolfo Diaz MENDOZA, Defendant
and Respondent.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Appellant,
v.
Alberto Ruiz MENDIETA, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 20922.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 1, 1987

Evidence obtained during search of car
A..' MIppreused by the Fifth District Court,
>v . ^uiti'.'n County. J Harlan Burns, J.,
•*. ; the Stat*- appealed. The Supreme
•. :. P-irbam, J., held that: (1) there was
• ' rea.<»>nable suspicion for border patrol
-ffi'vrs to stop north bound vehicle convening "Latin-appearing" occupants and
d^i-lawn^ California license plates; (2)
K-^d faith exception to exclusionary rule
•'"•i:".",ot apply to investigatory stop and
*»-arch; and (3) the Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act is unconstitutional.
Affirmed.
Zimmerman, J., filed a concurring opinion.
Hall, C.J., and Howe, J., filed separate
concurring and dissenting opinions.

*• Aliens 0 3 3 . 8
Border patrol officers' stop of vehicle
•''•• interstate highway was not supported
">' re-\ onable suspicion based on apparent
l-itin descent" of occupants, route of trav*-. tunc of day, time of year, California
- >i:»e plat<\>, "erratic" driving behavior in
U;:
U vehicle did not immediately vacate left
k*e when officers approached at high
*P*H then, after being tailed at distance of
l
* o to six feet, switched to right lane and
suddenly slowed down, and subsequent
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U.S.C.A.

C o n s t . A r i . » n d . 4.

2. Criminal Law C=>3«M.!<2>
Good-faith exception to exclusionary
rule can never apply to investigatory stop
and search in that, if no reasonable suspicion exists to justify investigatory stop,
officer's conduct was not reasonable within
meaning of the exception and, in any event,
exception cannot operate where no outside
authority on which officers reasonably relied expressly authorized the search. U.S.
C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
3. Criminal Law <3=39l.ii2)
Searches and Seizures C=^12
The Fourth A m e n d e . T:t Enforcement
Act is unconstitutional in purporting to create a "good faith" exception to exelu.Merv
ary rule with respect to investigatory
stops. U.C.A.1953, 77-3o-i2(g); U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.
4. Criminal Law <£=>394.i(2K 394.5(1)
Searches and Seizures 0=12
Even where "good faith" exception to
exclusionary rule is applicable, the Fourth
Amendment Enforcement Act is unconstitutional, both in shifting burden of proof to
defendant to prove police conduct in bad
faith and in requiring illegal conduct that
goes beyond being objectively unreasonable. U.C.A.1953, 77-35-12(g), (gM2)(i, ii);
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
David L. Wilkinson, David B. Thompson,
Salt Lake City, Peter L. Rognlie, St.
George, for plaintiff and appellant.
J. MacArthur Wright. John Miles. St.
George, for defendant and respondent Mendoza.
John E. Meyers, Los An^de>. California,
for defendant and respondent Mendieta.
DURHAM, Justice:
The State brought th:< apical to challenge the trial court's suppression of evidence obtained during a search of the car
in which defendants were traveling. The
State assigns as error the trial court's use
of a probable cause standard to determine
the validity of the stop, the trial court's
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find::-' that. defendants had standing to
chal!'-ng«.' the validity of the search, and the
trial court's failure to make findings pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-121 g)
(VJH2).

We affirm.

The following summary of the facts is
based on testimony from both the suppression hearing and the preliminary hearing.
The trial judge relied on testimony from
both in granting the motion to suppress.
On March 16, 1985, two United States
Immigration Service border patrol officers
observed the northbound traffic on 1-15
south of St. George, Utah, from a car
parked on the median for that purpose.
Their car was green, with official decals on
both doors and a light bar mounted on the
roof. At approximately 4:50 a.m., three
cars approached the officer's position, including the black Mustang in which defendants were traveling. Officer Stiegler testified that his partner, Officer Fox, told him
that the car deserved a closer look because
the occupants appeared to be of Latin descent. Officer Fox, however, testified at
the suppression hearing that he could not
remember making the statement concerning defendants' apparent ethnic origin.
Officer Fox, the driver of the border
patrol car, pulled onto the highway and
began to pursue the black Mustang. In
order to catch up with it before it reached a
rest stop, where the officers could view the
car and its passengers with the aid of roadside lights, the officers followed the Mustang at high speed. When they caught up
with defendants' vehicle, it failed to leave
the left lane despite the officers' rapid approach; however, neither officer could testify that the occupants of the Mustang had
seen the officers' car approach. The officers matched the Mustang's speed and followed at a distance of two to six feet. The
officers then noticed that the Mustang had
California license plates.
The Mustang eventually pulled into the
right lane and decelerated rapidly. Both
officers described the car's movements as
"jerky." The officers pulled alongside the
Mustang, dropped back, and then pulled
alongside the car again. With the aid of
the lights from the rest stop, the officers

determined th.it defendants appeared to be
of "Latin de*-c* :;.:" arid behaved "nervously." When asked to describe defendants'
behavior more >:"ectfieally, however, the officers testified or.'.y that defendants avoided eye contact with the officers. Ba<ed on
the time of year, the California license
plates on the car, defendants' "nervous"
behavior, defendants' physical characteristics, and the "jerky" driving, the officers
decided to pull the Mus.tang over and question defendants concerning their citizenship
status.
The officers questioned both defendants,
and neither was able to produce adequate
identification. The officers arrested defendants and placed them in the back of
the officers' car. At this point, the officers
opened the funk ol the Mustang to determine if it contained any other passengers
and discovered the fifty-one bags of marijuana that were the subject of the motion
to suppress.
We consider first the propriety of the
initial stop. The State contends that the
trial judge improperly assessed the validity
of the stop under a probable cause standard instead of the appropriate "reasonable
suspicion" standard. The plain language
of the suppression order does not, however,
support the State's position. The order
reads, "[Tjhere were no (articulable) facts
as a basis or prcbacoe cause for the stop."
(Emphasis added.) Use of the disjunctive
indicates that the trial judge found not only
a lack of probable cause, but also a lack of
any basis whatsoever for the stop. The
transcript of the trial court's ruling supports this interpretation. The transcript
indicates that the trial judge found "there
was no basis for the original stop," without
making any reference to a lack of probable
cause. Although inclusion of the probable
cause language in the order confuses the
standard applied by the trial court, that
language does not indicate that the trial
judge suppressed the evidence in question
solely because the facts failed to meet the
more restrictive probable cause standard.
[1] Even under the "reasonable suspicion" standard announced in United States
v. Brignom-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884, 95
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S.Ct 2571, 25*1, 45 L.Ed.2d r,07 (1075), the
facts known to the border patrol officers-at
the time they stopped the Mustang did not
justify the stop. In Brignoni-Ponce, the
United States Supreme Court reviewed the
propriety of a stop, based solely on the
"Mexican" appearance of a vehicle's three
occupants, to investigate the possible transportation of illegal aliens. The Court held,
"Except at the border and its functional
equivalents, officers on roving patrol may
stop vehicles only if they are aware of
specific, articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles
contain aliens who may be illegally in the
country." Id. The sole fact relied upon by
the border patrol officers in BrignoniPonce was the "apparent Mexican ancestry" of the vehicle's occupants. Id. at 88.586, 95 S.Ct. at 2582-83. The Court held
that apparent Mexican ancestry alone did
not furnish "reasonable grounds to believe
that the three occupants were aliens." Id.
at 886, 95 S.Ct. at 2582.

Utah

183

19*7)

(19M). The reviewing court should not
overturn the trial c a r t ' s determination unless ft is clearly err- r.vous. Id. at 41'); see
'also State v. Ga! leges. 712 P.lM 207, 20S09 (Utah 19N">). A review of the facts in
this case indicates that the trial judge's
order suppressing the questionable evidence was not clearly erroneous.
The officers in this case relied on the
following facts in determining that they
had a reasonable suspicion justifying the
stop of the Mustang: (1) the apparent "Latin descent" of the occupants of the Mustang; (2) the route of travel; (3) the time ot
day; (4) the time of year; (5) the California
license plates; (6) the erratic driving pattern; and (7) the nervous behavior of the
occupants.
As to the first factor, Officer Stiegler
simply testified that the occupants of the
Mustang appeared to be of "Latin descent." He did not identify any characteristics observed before the stop, such as
clothing or haircut, that would indicate
Mexican nationality. Many United States
citizens and residents have physical characteristics that might be classified as Latin.
Without other observations concerning
physical characteristics that would indicate
alien status, Latin appearance has only minor probative value in determining if a
suspect has entered the country illegally.

In Brignoni-Ponce, the Court listed several factors for consideration in determining if the officers had reasonable suspicion
to justify the stop of the suspect vehicle:
(1) the characteristics of the area, including
its proximity to the border, usual traffic
patterns, and previous experience with
alien traffic; (2) information concerning reLikewise, the Mustang's route of travel
cent border crossings in the area; (3) the
and
California license plates have little prodriver's behavior, including erratic driving
bative
value in determining if the officers
or an obvious attempt to evade officers; (4)
had
a
reasonable
suspicion to stup the vethe characteristics of the vehicle itself,
hicle.
The
officers
testified that 1-15 is
such as its size and observations indicating
frequently
used
by
those
involved in transthat the vehicle is heavily loaded; (5)
porting
illegal
aliens
from
the Californiawhether the occupants of the vehicle are
Mexico
border
to
destinations
north and
trying to conceal themselves; and (6)
east
of
California.
However.
1-15
is also
whether the occupants have a characteristic Mexican appearance, i.e., particular the only major interstate highway for legal
style of haircut or dress. The officer is traffic to locations northeast of Southern
entitled to assess the facts available to him California. It seems unlikely that illegal
in light of his experience. Id. at 884-85, 95 alien transporters comprise a significant
S.Ct. at 2581-82. In determining whether portion of interstate traffic on 1-15 at disthe facts support a reasonable suspicion tances as far from the Mexican border as
that a vehicle is engaged in illegal activity, SL George, Utah.
the trial court must consider the totality of
Similarly, the time of year and the time
the circumstances facing the officers. of day of the £top have little relevance.
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417- Although the density of the traffic on 1-15
18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694-95, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 varies, travelers use the interstate highway
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at all times of the day and night and at all
times of the year. See, e.g., United States
v. Shields, 534 F.2d 605, 608 (5th Cir. 1976).
But cf. United States v. Quiroz-Carrasco,
565 F.2d 1328, 1330 (5th Cir. 1978) (defendants stopped on a road at a time when
virtually no local traffic was present).
The officers also testified that they relied
on defendants' erratic driving behavior in
deciding to stop the Mustang. When asked
to describe this behavior more specifically,
however, they merely cited defendants' initial failure to yield the left lane to the
approaching patrol car and their subsequent lane change and rapid deceleration.
We do not see how this behavior would
give rise to a suspicion that the occupants
of the car were engaged in illegal activity.
Defendants made no attempt to evade the
officers; rather, they changed lanes and
slowed down. If anything, defendants'
conduct facilitated their apprehension by
the officers.
The final fact relied upon by the officers
was defendants' "nervous
behavior.'
When asked to describe defendants' behavior more specifically, the officers merely
stated that defendants' had a "whiteknuckled" or rigid look and failed to make
eye contact. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals has held that the failure to make
eye contact can have no weight in determining if the officers had a reasonable
suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop.
United States v. Pacheco, 617 F.2d 84,
86-87 (5th Cir.1980); United States v. Lopez, 564 F.2d 710, 712 (5th Cir.1977).
Additionally, several of the factors listed
in Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885-86, 95
S.Ct. at 2582-83, are absent here. Defendants did not try to evade the officers, nor
did they attempt to conceal anyone or anything when the officers began pursuing the
Mustang. The car did not meet the typical
profile of a vehicle used for smuggling, nor
was there any indication that the vehicle
was heavily loaded. See United States v.
Garcia, 732 F.2d 1221, 1224-25 (5th Cir.
1984) (several factors including the appear1. The officers testified that license plates From
other states on the United States-Mexico border,
as well as those from states that arc the typical

ar.ee of the occupants and the heavily loaded truck were sufficient to uphold an investigatory stop).
Finally, the officers
stopped the car a considerable distance
from the Mexican border.
Adopting the State's position would essentially authorize the stop of all northbound vehicles on 1-15 containing "Latin• appearing" occupants and displaying suspect state license plates.1 Such a holding
would substantially interfere with the
fourth amendment rights of those travelers. We hold that the facts in this case do
not support a reasonable suspicion that defendants were engaged in illegal activity;
therefore, the trial court's finding that the
stop violated defendants' fourth amendment rights was not clearly erroneous.
Our holding that the investigatory stop
violated defendants' fourth amendment
rights obviates the need to discuss the propriety of the search. Because we find the
stop itself unconstitutional, all evidence
subsequently sei.-.ed is inadmissible. See,
e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L Ed.2d 441 (1%3); 4
W. LaFave. Search and Seizure § 11.4(d),
at 407-08 (2d ed. 1987).
Our holding as to the unconstitutionality
of the initial st ;»p also eliminates the necessity to address the standing issue. Because the State' based its standing argument on the propriety of the search, and
because the validity of the search does not
affect our holding, we do not discuss defendants' standing to challenge the search.
We next turn to the State's challenge to
the trial eoun's failure to make the findings required by Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-35-12<g> <19>2). part of the Fourth
Amendment Enforcement Act, Pursuant
to that section, a trial court may only suppress evidence when it finds a substantial
fourth amendment violation that was not
made in good faith
A defendant must
first prove a substantial violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The State
must then prove good faith on the part of
the police officer in order to prevent supdestinations for illegal alien traffic, would have.
aroused their suspicion.
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pre .-.don of the evidence. The section further requires the trial court to state its
reasons for finding a substantial violation
and a lack of good faith. In considering
this assignment of error, we fir^t determine whether section 77-35-12(g) meets
federal constitutional standards.
In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct.
1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), the United
States Supreme Court applied the exclusionary rule to the states by virtue of the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 655, 81 S.Ct.
at 1691. As a result, the United States
Constitution requires suppression of evidence seized pursuant to a search or seizure made in violation of the fourth amend
merit. In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984),
however, the Court created an exception to
blanket application of the exclusionary
rule. The Court held that the rule does not
apply where the state establishes that an
officer exhibited "objectively reasonable"
reliance on a magistrate's probable cause
determination and on the technical sufficiency of the search warrant issued. Id. at
922-23, 104 S.Ct. at 3420-21.
Although Leon involved a search conducted pursuant to a subsequently invalidated warrant, the State argues that the
Leon holding does not restrict application
of the "good faith" exception to warrantless searches. Admittedly, much of the
language in Leon intimates a broader application of the rule. While the State correctly argues that no language in the Leon
opinion specifically restricts application of
the exception to searches pursuant to a
warrant, 2 we do not agree that it can apply
2.

We note that much of the language in Leon
suggests a broader application of the rule. For
example, the Court states that the exclusionary
rule should not apply to objectively reasonable
police activity and that this is especially true
where the officer has obtained a search warrant
and acted within i's scope. Leon, 468 U.S. at
919-20, 104 S.Ct. at 3418-19. This language
implies that all objectively reasonable police
conduct should enjoy immunity from the exclusionary rule and that obtaining a warrant has
the effect of creating an even greater presumption of validity of the police activity as long as
the officer obtained the warrant in good faith.
Because the statute, by its terms, applies to all
motions to suppress evidence without distinguishing between motions to challenge warrant-
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to warrantless searches of the kind involved in this case.
The basis for the Leon exception is that
the exclusionary rule serves no other purpose than lo pur.ish law enforcement officers for knowingly or negligently conducting a wrongful search and to deter such
conduct in the future. Id. at 918-21, 104
S.Ct. at 341S-19. When, however, a police
officer obtains a warrant and relies on it
with objective reasonableness, exclusion of
the evidence due to a subsequent invalidation of the warrant would serve no purpose. Id. Thus, the opinion's foundation
is that excluding illegally-seized evidence
when a police officer has received authorization to conduct a search, has restricted
his search to the boundaries of the.authorization, and ha^ a reasonable basis for relying on the authorization would defeat the
ends of jus?:ot\
[2] Whether or not we agree with the
Leon view of the exclusionary rule's purpose, the exception cannot operate in this
situation for two reasons. First, no outside
authority on which the officers could reasonably rely expressly authorized the
search of the vehicle; therefore, the policy
foundations of the Leon exception do not
appear in searches of the kind- involved in
this case.3
Second, the Leon exception, by its own
terms, could never apply to an investigatory stop and search. As we have already
discussed, Brignoni-Ponce permits the use
of evidence obtained during a search conducted after an investigatory stop only
less searches from motions to challenge
searches conducted pursuant to a waiiant, only
the broader application of the "good faith" exception suggested in the Leon dicta can justify
the scope of the statute.
3.

In Illinois v. Krall — U.S.
. 107 S.Ct.
1160, 94 L.Ed.:d 364 (1937). the United States
Supreme Court extended the Leon exception to a
situation where the police conducted a search
pursuant to a subsequently invalidated statute.
Id., 107 S.CL at 1167. Krull does not affect our
character&ation of Leon. In both cases, the
officers conducting the searches did so in objectively reasonable reliance on prior, external authorization.
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when articulable facts give rise to a reasonable suspicion. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
at S-S4, 95 S.Ct. at 2581. In essence, this
requires objectively reasonable conduct in
the decision to search, the same objective
reasonableness that an officer must exercise when relying on a subsequently invalidated search warrant. If no reasonable
suspicion exists to justify an investigatory
stop, rendering a subsequent search illegal,
then the officer whose conduct is in question could not have acted reasonably.
Thus, the Leon exception could never apply
to an invalidated investigatory stop and
search.
[3J Because Leon could never apply to
investigatory stops and searches, and because the Fourth Amendment Enforcement
Act purports to create a "good faith" exception to such searches, that Act violates
the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution.

pn*>>:."i regardless of the egregiousness of,
or the intentions motivating, the police officers' conduct. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655, 81
S.Ct. at 1691. Because Leon is an exception to the application of the exclusionary
rule, the State must prove the necessary
elements of the "good faith" exception.
Section 77-oo~12(g}, however/shifts the
burden of proof to the defendant, who
must prove the equivalent of police conduct
made in bail faith before the court can
apply the exclusionary rule.
Subsections (i) and (ii) of section 77-3512(g)t2l also exceed the bounds of the exception established in Leon because both
require less than objectively reasonable
conduct in order for section 77-35-12(g) to
provide an exception. Pursuant to the
broad reading of Leon, a. court will not
admit the illegally-seized evidence if it
finds the police conduct objectively unreasonable. Conduct that is objectively unreasonable, however, is not equivalent to
grossly negligent, willful, or malicious conduct: nor does it always arise from either
an intent to harass or pursuant to department policy. Because subsections (i) and
(ii) of section 77-3o-12(g)(2) validate conduct that is nut objectively reasonable under Ltu'i. they are unconstitutional.

[4] Even assuming for the sake of argument that the "good faith" exception
established by Leon applies to the type of
search involved in this case, the statutes in
question here are still unconstitutional.
Section 77-35-12(g)(l) requires defendants
to establish a substantial violation of their
fourth amendment rights. A violation is
"substantial" under section 77-35-12(g)(2)
The state legislature indicated that if any
if
part of section 77-35-12(g) was held inval(i) The violation was grossly negligent, id, the Fourth Amendment Enforcement
willful, malicious, shocking to the con- Act would "be void in its entirety." H.B.
science of the court or was a result of 69. 44th Leg.. Bud. Sess., 19S2 Utah Laws
the practice of the law enforcement ch. 10. § 16. Thus, our holding that the
agency pursuant to a general order of substantial violation requirement violates
that agency;
the fourtl" an.tr.dment of the United State*
(ii) The violation was intended only to Constitution renders invalid all of the statharass without legitimate law enforce- utes passed in the Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act. We therefore do not need
ment purposes.
This threshold requirement is beyond the to discus- the trial court's failure to make1
scope of the "good faith" exception for two findings as to the officers' good faith.
reasons. First, Leon establishes an excepBecause we affirm on other grounds the
tion to the applicability of the exclusionary trial court's order suppressing the evirule. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922, 104 S.Ct. at dence, we do not; reach the issues raised by
3420. Pursuant to Mapp, if the defendant defendants concerning a possible Miranda
establishes a fourth amendment violation, ^violation and the officers' lack of statutory
the illegally-seized evidence must be sup- authority to stop defendants.
4. The stop in this case and section 77-35-12(g)
both fall below the standards required by the
fourth amendment to the United States Consti-

tution. We do not analyze the Ie\el of conduct
required b\ Utah Constitution article I, section
14. We rcsene this question for the future.
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Th- decision of the trial court is affirmed.
STEWART, Associate C.J., concurs.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (concurring).
I join in the majority's analysis. However, I feel compelled to add several comments.
First, I find particularly outrageous the
State's attempt to justify the stop of Mendoza and Mendieta by citing the fact that
they reacted anxiously to the pursuit and
surveillance conduct of the two INS officers. In the 4:50 a.m. darkness on March
16th, Mendoza and Mendieta were driving
along 1-15 in the left lane. Suddenly, a car
approached from the rear at a very high
rate of speed. When it approached the
Mendoza/Mendieta vehicle, it abruptly
slowed down and then trailed Mendoza and
Mendieta at freeway speeds, separated
from their rear bumper by only two to six
feet. Only the headlights of the officers'
car were illuminated. In the dark, there
was nothing that would alert Mendoza and
Mendieta that the vehicle behind them was
a police car. Mendoza and Mendieta then
pulled into the right lane and slowed down.
At this point, they appeared "nervous" to
the officers.

However, even if this r».-adir.g of Leon were
in error, the Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act would not necessarily be saved.
As I have observed previously in State v.
Hygh, 711 P.2d 264. 271-74 (Utah 19S:>)
(Zimmerman, J., concurring), the whole
question of the protections that are afforded by and the remedies available under
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, our own search and seizure provision,
has never been carefully considered by this
Court.
HALL, Chief Justice: (concurring
and dissenting).
Application of the clearly erroneous standard of review ! prompts me to concur in
affirming the judgment of the trial court.
However, I reserve judgment as to whether
the exclusionary rule as espoused in United States v. Leon 2 has application to a
warrantless search. I also reserve judgment as to the constitutionality of Utah
Code Ann. § 77-35-12(g) (1982) and whether it has application to a warrantless
search.
HOWE, Justice: (concurring and
dissenting).

Second, I agree with the majority that
the "good faith" exception suggested in
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104
S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), cannot be
applied generally to warrantless searches.

I concur except I would not reach and
determine the constitutionality of section
77-35-12(g), also known as rule 12(g), Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The majority
correctly holds that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule enunciated in
United States v. Leon, 46S U.S. 897, 104
S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), cannot
apply to the warrantless search made in
the instant case. Eor the same reasons
and because of the inherent lack of good
faith in their making, section 77-35-12(g>
does not apply to such searches. See subparagraphs (3)\ii) and (iii) of section 78-3512(g).
I would not attempt to apply the statute
to a fact situation it was never intended to
cover (warrantless search) and then because it is unconstitutional as there applied,
declare the statute unconstituuonal in all

1. Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a); State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d
1255, 1258 (Utah 1987).

2. 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677
(1984).

Any sane person would appear nervous if
something like this occurred while traveling along a lonely stretch of one of our
interstates in the early morning hours. I
find ludicrous the State's argument that
because these individuals appeared to have
been unsettled by the officers' extraordinary conduct, the officers had justification
for suspecting that something improper
was going on, and on this basis, they were
entitled to pull the vehicle over and institute an investigation that led to a search of
the vehicle. This is pretextual fourth
amendment gamesmanship at its worst.
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per had obtained a copy of the petition, ther, almost nine months expired before
including the first and final accounting, appellants raised their claim of lack of due
al^d had taken it to his legal counsel in S^lt process. Because Rule 60(bX7) requires
Lake City prior to the October 7, 19&1, suc\ a claim to be made within a "reason^'
hea^ng. Appellants did not need to digest able lime," the trial court did not abus^fts
the etatire 233-page document prior to the discretion in refusing to set aside theyOctohearing to enable them to object./Pages ber 8, 1981, order.
one anti two are a summary of the accountAppellants also assert that notice to their
ing in me form recommended bVthe pro- mother, Fannie N. Pepper, wa/inadequate
bate division. The amount of th^assets on
because sheVwas legally incompetent, and
hand for\ distribution is unambiguously
Zions was awkre of that. Although Phillip
written on $he "bottom line" of the summaC. Pepper wak appointed/conservator for
ry. This fapt alone, in light of appellants'
his mother by an Arizona court, he made
allegations 6$ Zions' earlier representations
no motion to join ms mother in the petition.
regarding the value of the estate, should
Nor is she a partyyto/this appeal. Hence,
have sufficiently alerted them that somewe do not considerywhether her due prothing might be\awry and caused them to
appear at the hearing. If appellants did cess rights were violated.
We hold that the Court did not err in
not agree with the amount/shown on the
summary, they haci more than ample time denying appellants' petition and in granting
to appear at the hearing apd lodge an ob- Zions* motion tp dismiss.\ Affirmed. Costs
jection or ask for a Continuance to study to respondent
the document. Continuances of this type
are given as a matter \ of course by the
HALL, Ctt., STEWART 4nd DURHAM,
court in probate proceedings. Additionally, JJ., and /DEAN E. CONQJER, District
appellants had three months in which they Judge, COTicur.
could have moved for relief under Rule
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate
60(b)(1) to (4). We acknowledge that the
herein/
CONDER, District Judg^, sat.
granting of a continuance^ discretionary
with the trial court and that "[t]he right of
a citizen to due process of Jaw must rest
KEY NUMBER SYSTEM
upon a basis more substantial than favor or
discretion." Roller v. Holly,\ll6 U.S. 398,
20 S.Ct. 410, 44 L.Ed. 520 (1900). In
Roller, the United States Supreme Court
set aside an 1891 default judgment on due
process grounds, holding that five days'
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
notice to Roller, a Virginia resident, to apRespondent,
pear in a Texas court was insufficient to
v.
allow Roller to travel to Texas, hire an
attorney, and prepare his case. However,
Gillis HYGH, Defendant and Appellant.
in these days of efficient rapid transportaNo. 19402.
tion and relatively inexpensive telecommuSupreme Court of Utah.
nications, we are less willing to allow distance alone to weigh heavily on oim review
Aug. 16, 1985.
of the adequacy of the notice. Here, Phillip C. Pepper had discussed Zions' petition
with leg&l counsel in Salt Lake City prior to
Defendant was convicted in the Third
the hearing, but neither he nor his counsel District Court, Salt Lake County, Homer F.
appeared at the hearing to registers any Wilkinson,^., of aggravated robbery, and
objection. Under these facts, appellknts he appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall,
wer£ not denied due process of law. Fur- C.J., held that: (1) inventory search of de-
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fendant's vehicle was not proper since it
was pretextual and not conducted according to proper procedures, and (2) trial court
did not abuse its discretion in limiting
cross-examination of service station attendant who was robbed by limiting questioning concerning the exact method of activation of surveillance camera during robber}*.
Reversed and remanded.
Zimmerman, J., concurred and filed
opinion in which Durham, J., concurred.
1. Arrest <S=71.1(1)
Searches and Seizures C=3.3(4, 7)
In order for a search to be constitutionally permissible, a search warrant issued by neutral magistrate and based upon
probable cause is required unless search is
'within an exception to the warrant requirement such as:,-limited search incident to
lawful arrest, search of an automobile
based on probable cause thai it contains
contraband,.or seizure of evidence in plain
view by one with a lawful right" to "be in a
position to so observe i t " Const* Art 1,
§ 14: U.S.C.A. Const Amend. 4.
2. Searches and Seizures C=3.3(6)
An inventory search constitutes an exccption to the warrant requirement a warrantless search of an imj»ounded vehicle for
purposes of protecting police and public
from danger, avoiding police liability for
lost or stolen property and protecting owner's property is pcrmitt*. i by the State and
Federal Constitutions. Const. Art. 1, § 14;
U.S.C.A. Const Amend. 4.
3. Criminal Lau c=a*9J.4<3)
Searches and Sii/urt* 0=>3.3tl)
Contraband or othtr tvi !• nee of crime
di-ruvered in a true ir.w:.ti<r\ ?»a.rch may
be seized without a u arrant and introduced
into evidence at trial. O r.st Art. 1. J 14;
U.S.C.A. Con^tAmend. 4.
4. Searches and Seizures C=3.3<1)
Inventory'^earch-tXCcption to iht warrant requirement d'*;-not a;^!y ~;.cn the
inventory i* rntrcfv a pret» \ ! f - v r ^ f ^ f air
invt .^G^atory j*ot?rc mmn~r~ ?:rr^a??v_ntal
co:

sonable searches cannot be evaded by labeling thern "inventory" searches. Const
.Art 1, § 14; U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
5. Searches and Seizures e=>3.3(6)
In order that an inventory search of a
vehicle be lawful, there must have been
reasonable and proper justification for the
vehicle's impoundment, either through explicit statutory authorization or through
circumstances surrounding the initial stop.
Const A r t 1, § 14; U.S.C.A. Const Amend.
4.
6. Searches and Seizures <£=7(29)
It is the state's burden to establish
necessity for taking an inventory of a vehicle. Const Art 1, § 14; U.S.C.A. Const
Amend. 4.
7. Searches and Seizures c=3.3(6)
Search of automobile was not a valid
inventory search, since it appeared to be a
pretext for a warrantless search and officer did not follow proscribe procedures in
that' officer did"nut" involve owner of vebine, who_was present-.in his derision \6
conduct search, rather than permitting
owner to make othtr cv- position of vehicle,
y^ffv
-officer did not completely .starch the vehicle or make !I.-t of nrm- foand. and office* had sent another officer t<» retrieve
photo of r^M^ry -u.p^ct f.en hef'-re asking defendant (>r h;> u- <'.M and registration, uaited for ph**to before b»>':.\ning
search, arid searched uith picture in hand.
Const Art. 1, § 14; US C.A. f <•.'.-' Amend.
4.
8. Criminal Law C--f,r,2.7
Right to confrontation includes right to
cro.-.-t xamine witnesses; however, this
right is not absolute, as trial court has
discretion in limiting scope and extent of
cross-examination which will not be rewr.-ed on review absent an abuse. U.S.
C.A. ConstAmend. 6.
3. Criminal La* C-662.7
Vi ^ati-.n of cunfrur
i.ati'-n c-'.ld r-

...My

- e <]'*s

U

ev;

' > ami•'d to
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have a substantial effect on jury's decision.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6.
10. Witnesses <S=>271(1)
Trial court did not abuse its discretion
in limiting defendant's cross-examination of
service station clerk to preclude questioning as to exact method he used to activate
surveillance camera during robbery, for
purpose of authenticating photos of suspect, since testimony as to how camera was
activated could not reasonably be expected
to have had a substantial effect en jury's
decision in light of clerk's testimony that
photographs depicted man who robbed the
station in the act, his personal identification
of defendant as the man in photo, and
foundational testimony authenticating the
photographs. U.S.C.A. ConsLAmend. 6.
Edward Brass, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., J. Stephen Mikita, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
and respondent

surveillance camera that had been installed
by the Salt Lake City Police Department
the previous month. After the robber left,
the clerk called the police. The police had
also been alerted to the robbery by an
alarm in the police dispatcher's office
which went off when the surveillance camera was activated. The police arrived
shortly thereafter. The film from the surveillance camera was unloaded by a detective ar.d taken for developing. Several of
the developed pictures showing the robber's face and clothing were posted at city
police stations on the line-up boards.
Immediately after the robbery, the clerk
identified the robber to police as a black
man wearing a rust or red colored ski mask
on his head but not over his face. The
robber was also wearing a khaki colored
coat with "furry" lining and with a rip over
the left pocket The surveillance camera
pictures showed this description to be accurate.

On January 6, 1983, a Salt Lake City
police officer, Officer Foster, after
stopping for a traffic light in the left lane
HALL, Chief Justice:
next to defendant's car, noticed an expired
Defendant Gillis Hygh appeals a convic- rejected safety inspection sticker' on detion of aggravated robbery, a first degree fendant's lower left front windshield. Offifelony. U.C.A., 1953. § 7 $-6-302 (197S). cer Foster also noticed that the driver reDefendant alleges that the warrantless "in- sembled the individual in the photograph of
ventory search** of his automobile after he the rcM-ery suspect posted at the police
was placed under custodial arrest was un- 'station. The officer testified at the hearing U> suppress the evidence taken from
lawful. We agree.
defendant's
car that he stopped defendant's
At about 10:00 p.m. on DecemU-r 31,
car
because
of the expired safety inspec1932. a man entered a service station in
2
tion
sticker.
Salt Like City and asked for a pack of
After stopping defendant's car, Foster
cigarettes. As the clerk handed the customer the cigarettes, the customer pulled sent a second officer to the police station to
a .22 caliber revolver from under his coat get the posted photo of the robbery susand ordered the clerk to empty the cash jK-ct Foster then checked defendant's
register. The clerk did so, putting approxi- driver's license and registration. The car
mately $350 into a paper bag. As he was was registered to defendant, but defendant
emptying the register, the clerk activated a had no driver's license with him. A radio
1.

A rejected inspection sticker is placed on a
vehicle if the \chicle does not pass the annual
safety inspection. The ouner of the vehicle
then ha^ five days to complete repairs and briruj
the vehicle back to be reinspccted.

2.

At the pretrial suppression hearinp. Officer
Foster trstified: T h e reason I stopped him was

because of the inspection sticker." At trial. Officer Fover was asked this question: "Was the
parti ru*. ax reason that you slopped the Defendant's \ c h i d e , did it have anything to do uith any
phoros thai you had seen earlier that da> at the
P*>!ice*s:a:.on?" He replied: That uas the reason. >r-s.*
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call to the police dispatcher verified that
defendant had a license, but also revealed
two outstanding misdemeanor arrest warrants against defendant Officer Foster
placed defendant under arrest on the basis
of those warrants, handcuffed him, and put
him in the patrol car.
Foster then ascertained that defendant's
passenger was not a licensed driver and
called for an impound wrecker to tow the
car away.

cied by the trial court on the basis that the
search was a proper inventory search. At
a trial before a jury, defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery. Defendant appeals, seeking a reversal of that conviction
and a new trial.
[1]-Article I, section 14 of the Utah
State Constitution, and the fourth amend*
me^t to the United States Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.
I s order for a search to,be constitutionally
permissible* a search warrant issued by a
pc^iral magistrate and based upon probable cause is required. There are, however/
^evtral exceptions to the warrant requirement. These include a limited search incident to a lawful arrest; 5 scorch of an
automobile based on probable cause that ft
contains contraband,J and seizure of evidence in p!ain view* by one with a lawful
right to be in a position to so observe i t 1

After the second officer returned with
the photo, Officer Foster conducted &
search of defendant's car with the photo in
his hand.1 He did not use an inventory
sheet and did not make a list of the items
found in the car.4 In the trunk, the officer
found several jackets, a cap, several shirts,
and a ski mask lying over the spare tire
The officer also found an unripped plastic
gym bag. The officer looked inside the
bag and found a .22 caliber revolver. The
[21 It is also well established that an
gas station clerk later identified the ski inventor}* search constitutes an exception
mask, one of the jackets, and the gun as to the warrant requirement 1 A warrantthose used by the robber. The clerk also ies! search of an impounded vehicle for thp
identified defendant as the robber. After purposes of protecting the police and pubnc
the search of the car, Officer Foster trans- fK'"rrT"3ar.gcr* avoiding' police liability for
ported defendant to the police station. Of- lost £>r $to!tm property, and protecting the
ficer Foster informed the robbery detective "owner's ^>j«erty,TTpermitte d by the fourth
that he believed defendant was the robber amendrueiU and article I, section 14 of the
of the service station. The detective ques- Utah State Constitution.1
tioned defendant, then ordered Officer Fos[3. 4) Because inventories promote such
ter to place defendant under arrest for
important interests and are not investigatoaggravated robbery.
ry in purpose, they do not implicate "the
At a pretrial suppression hearing, de- interests which are protected when
,§
fendant asked to have the clothing items searches are conditioned on warrants."
and the revolver taken from the car sup- Therefore, inventor}* searches are not per
'pressed as being the result of a preU \tual, se unreasonable within the rin r-.ning of the
warrantless search. The motion was de- fourth a m e n d m e n t and article I, section 14
3.

The record indicates that Foster searched onl\
the trunk of the \chiclc

4.

At the pretrial suppression hearing. Foster u i i
a^led: "When you impound a car. Officer, do
you use an inventory sheet of v me lir.d"*" He
replied. "So, I don't. Fcrsonalh I don't."

5.

Chime! v. California. 395 VS. 752. S9 S.Cl.
2034, 23 LFd.2d 6S5 (1969).

6.

Chambers v. Maroney, 399 VS. 42. 90 S.Cl.
1975. 26 L.Ld.2d 419(1970).

7.

CooUdge v. AVw Hampshire, 403 I S 443. 91
S.Cl. 2022. 29 LEd.2d 564 (1971).

g.

S.-.-//I IXilota v. Opptrman. 428 VS 364. 96
S C: 3 ^ 2 . 49 L.Ed 2d 1000 (1976). S:ate v. Cole.
l:;ih. 674 P2d 119. 126 (19S3).

9. O-j'p.rK'.zn, supra note 8; Slate v. Romero,
t-.2h ^24 r.2d 699 (1981); State v. Crabtrce,
l/uh. 61$ P.2d 484. 4S5 (19S0).
10. 0,;,rrrs%
428 VS. at 3S2-S3. 96 S Ct. at
3103-04. 49 LEd.2d 1000 (Powell. J., concurnr.g).
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Contraband or other evidence of crime dis- fore, we must look to the circumstances
covered in a true inventory search may be surrounding the stop to determine whether
seized without a warrant and introduced the impound was reasonable.
into evidence at triaL , |" However, the Jn^
Tentory exception doe? not apply when the
[6,7] It is the burden of the State to
invu;tory is sorely "a pretext concealing establish the necessity for the taking and
an^lnvestigatoiy police mouve.^ 1 ^ Fiindas? the inventor}* of the vehicle.1' In Salt Lake
mental constitutional guarantees against City, the police department has standards
unreasonable searches car.n:»; be evaded by set forth in a procedural o r d e r n whose
labeling them "inventory" searches.^
purpose is to implement a procedure for
15] In order to support a finding that a the handling of impounds and the use of
valid inventory search has taken place, the wreckers. Under this order, city police ofcourt must first determine whether there ficers are directed to impound a motor vewas reasonable and proper justification for hicle of an arrested person. However, the
the impoundment of the vehicle,11 This vehicle may be released at the scene to 1
justification, and thus lawful impoundment, party designated by the owner rather than
can be had either through explicit statutory be impounded,. A release form is provided
authorization or* by the circumstances sur
to the officers to be signed by the person
rounding the initial stop.14 flf impound
arrested designating an individual to take
n»t;nt was neither author::ei nor necessary,
'charge of the vehicle and releasing the
the search was unreasonable.1*
department and its officers from all liabiliUtah's statutes give a police dej artment ty.
authority to impound vehicles in several
Officer Foster testified that he did ascersituations. Vehicles may lawfully be imtain
that defendant's passenger was not a
pounded when they are ust-d to transport
licensed
driver. However, defendant was
controlled substances, U.C.A., 1953, § 5Sgiven
no
opportunity to arrange for disposi37-13; when the vehicle is irr.proj^rly regtion
of
his
own car. The officer neither
istered or stolen, U.C.A., 1953. § 41-1-115;
asked
defendant
whether there was someor when a vehicle is al ^r.i;:.ed, U.C.A.,
1953, § 41-6-116.10. j No fr-ecific statutory one who could come and get the car nor
authority exists authoriiiug ;:;.^und of a a s k e d the p a s s e n g e r w h e t h e r s h e could
vehicle stopped and parked on the str-et Lake po.-ses; ion of the c o n t e n t s of the car
after the driver has K-en am'-strd. There- or gut M>r:,eone tn c^rne ^nd g e t the car.
11. S<f, e.g.. Hams %. I 'i.-.vi 5 : J : « . 3 > U ' 5 234.
PS SCt. 992. 19 l.Fd.2d 1C*7 U c *5). R*t>e i
Cofwwcaltk.
2:0 Ya. 1C}'\ 1033. > 5 S F. 2d
746, 749 (19S0).
12.

Oppcrman.

425 IS

a: 37c. ^ S C: a: 3100.

13. State v. U.Dsn.el
156 NJ-Sjper 347. 3*455. 3S3 A.2d 1174. 1177 U975) Steele
Ar.no!..
Lawfulness of "lmer.'.orv Search" of Motor Yeh.cle Impounded b\ Pohce. 45 A L R 3d 537. 544
(1973):
Another c±**i»*+* f-rc;cq-:^ ':c 10 a valid inventory *c:irch is ihr. the pc]>ct rousJ have
taken lawful cutf <vH of ihc vehicle in ihe firsi
1 m: Jnee. It his ' therefore been held that
uhere ihc"cTrc'Lrr «.*::,-*« s^** that the ? ?\£C
ihxd no authr>r??> !o irrr*"v~~d the \eh»c!e, or
thai ponce cu>: JCLOI *.~e cf the %rhn»c \*a*
r 4 riCvc-.s^rVj the interior^ zcziLh u a i un
LrUuL
~ ---"'
[ l . J ^ f J . - s : .Jv of *~ irr # ^jr.!rd xe
hide d <s rut of c v ' f d ;<~>e * . $ ihc con

sutu: .i.ri.il n ^'.nn-merit of n .:•.•/r;:h!c.n.-«.s in
regard fo v . u t ! . ' ^ thereafter made of such
vehicle.
14. S<-e. e.g. r V ; . - " ; j n . 4 : s L'.S. at 375-76, <*
SCt at 3100, Copper \ California. 3?6 U.S. 58.
61-62. 67 S.Ct. 7PS, 790-91. 17 L F.d 2d 730
(1967); McDaniel
156 NJ.Super. at 355, 353
A.2d at 1177, State 1 \f ntaguc. 73 Wash.2d
3S1. 385, 43S P 2 d 571. 574 (1968).
15. See State v. G~Jnch.
506. 510 (1977).

Minn, 256 N W 2d

16. People v. Sagel 17 Cal.App 3d 492. 496-97. 95
Cal Rptr 129. 132 (1971). See alo
McD-i-.el
15* N J S . p c r u: 359. 3^3 K 2d at 1179.
17. Ordrr K^i:.\<t 1-79. ^[\^',.c
d^c March 1.
1979 Th»* r.-.f.r ;r. .r t: • -r.\ v ;••, ir.trr-,1 „ rd
i: ma!.
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The departmental order next establishes
procedures affecting all impounds- In pertinent part, that order states:
D. PROCEDURE [A]FFECTING ALL
IMPOUNDS.
1. When an impound occurs with the
owner present, the officer should ask
the owner if anything of value is in the
vehicle, make certain the owner knows
what steps are being taken to safeguard such property, and proceed as
follows:
a. The officer and the wrecker driver should make a thorough inventory
of the automobile, and fill in the impound slip completely, listing all necessary equipment on the car, in the car,
and in the trunk.
b. Any item lying loose in the vehicle should either be turned o\er to
the owner or locked in the trunk.
Small and/or valuable items should be
placed in Evidence for Safekeeping unless retained by the owner.

?tate "has not" met4U burdea-of sTfowiag
[jhe necessitv for the seizure of iKTvehicIer
We are not prepared to say that a true
inventor}* search cannot be made in the
presence of the vehicle's owner and without his consent However, if the purpose
of the search is truly only to inventor}* the
contents of the vehicle and to safeguard
them during impoundment, an indicia that
such is the real purpose of the search is to
consult with the owner of the vehicle when
he is present at the time of the impound
and the search.1*
However, even if it could be determined
that the impoundment itself was reasonably necessary, the search of the vehicle
trunk was nevertheless not a valid inventory search. As one commentator concluded
after reviewing Oppennan:
What is needed in the vehicle inventory
context, then . . . is not probable cause
but rather a regularized set of procedures which adequately guard against
arbitrariness.

Officer Foster did not ask defendant if
Inventories should not be uphold under
anything of value was in the vehicle or tell
Op
perm an unless the government
defendant of the steps being taken to safeshows
that there exists an established
guard his property. While all this was
reasonable
procedure for safeguarding
taking place, defendant was handcuffed
impounded
vehicles and their contents
and in Fo>ter's patrol car. Foster thu« did
and
that
the
challenged police activity
not give defendant any opportunity to arw
as
es.-entially
in conformance with that
range for disposition of his own jre'-vrty.
pn-v'idure.
This
means that a \ \,r\ ru-d
Further, the vehicle was parked next to the
.inventory
should
be held unlawful when
curb in a lawful parking area; no valuables
it
L
^
not
shown,
"for
[instance], that stanwere visible, and defendant had not indii*-d
dard inventory forms were
cated any were extant; a passenger was
*nd
kepi
fur
future
reference
(sh^v.
ing
f
available to remove any valuables for safe'presence or absence of valuables), nor
keeping at defendant's request ard to arthat a place of safekeeping for valuables
range for a third party to remove the veso Secured was maintained/' 26
hicle; the car could have been leaked and
The Salt Lake City Police Department
left unattended; and no evidtr.ee was
presented to indi a:»- that there w as a CuTr dtni'S have a regularized set of procedures
gw to police or pabl.c.1* k tMTca*fc, the'^ which are generally drafted to guard
i j > > .

18. Sic /;« r.rrc!>\ An not Lj-.*fwV.r« of "l-ven
r> Search" of M,.:<,r Vc* u'c Ir-^.-r.jrJ K 1
li'cc. 4E ALR.3J 537 (1*73).
19. 5.-.V t Jc-*tll

U

33= So.2J til.
Cf
.! IJ
IJ
.".!

t}* i l ~ M .

n,enl
n,eni of
o: \rVjclc p-sr- .
L L K. J - }
% 4 I - 1 - H 5 . officers aV <-ed tfrfrrdjr.t 1 re
move any iicms from \ehicle he w.v'cc to)

£ 0 . 2 t-aravc. Scurch & Seizure § 7.4. at 576-77
C*~r> (f".-:n^:r« r.mined) (quoting S.'dte v Jewe.V w,~'j note 19). S. c uho A<V~.V v. L-n£, 419
M.ch 636. 3'9 N W 2d 1^4 (1-.-4) (inventory
*e.v,K hc'J \r.\.-ild U,-.v:ve t>f lack of Mu..dard
p ' ;e p'f-.rJ :rcs for ti,r.J-. \r.g :r.; entory
v-.r^rs)
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against arbitrariness by an officer in the
field. However, Officer Foster did not fob
low these procedures. He did not involve
the owner of the vehicle, who was present,
in his decision. More importantly, the
record indicates that he did not completely
search the vehicle and did not mike any
kind of a list of the items in the automobile,
much less use a standard inventor}* form.
Without this, the search cannot be fairly
characterized as an Inventory search. In
addition, Officer Fos'er sent another officer to the police station to retrieve the
picture of the robbery suspect even before
asking defendant for his license and registration, waited for the picture before beginning the search, and searched with the
picture in his hand, r Those facts indicate
that the "inventory/* search was merely a
pretext for a"warr^atlrs^ .-earch. Under"*
these circumstance*, the e*IJence ciacoverva
ed in defendant's trunk should h^ve been
*suppre^ed as the rviul: of an ;mpru;^r,
warrantless* search. Defendant's conviction is thus reversed ar.d the case remanded for a new trial.
Defendant's second point on appeal is
that the trial court denied defendant his
constitutional right to be control ted uith
the witnesses against him It-cause di ft-r.dant's counsel was r.'>t alljut-d t^ cr*-ssexamine the State's witnesses s;*ee:fcal!y regarding how the survti'Lnce c^rr.^r- v as
activated. Defendant argut d he ui-h-. i to
present the defense of uh-.tht-r. :r. far;, the
camera was activated at the time cf the
robbery or could have :-•• n a;;iva!ei at
some earlier time. The S*:.u- c:;« *:» d to
cross-examination cor.a rr.ir.g the ]T*C:.-C
method of activation, arguing that th». r.wd
to maintain secrecy outweighed any r.evd
defendant might have for the information.
Tlie trial judge refused to allow cross-examination on that &sr»ect on the ground
that it was not relevant givtn the sco;-e of
direct examination.
^
2!. Fnher \: State. 7 Vk k?? 1. f-6. f-4? S U 2d
571. 573-74 (1952). S:c:e %. Itr-.Ji-i -v : JO
N M 2*0. 2M-62. 6?? F 7d 736. 73%?* '!*•*»

At trial, the State offered as evidence
photographs developed from the film taken
from the surveillance camera on the night
of the robbery. The gas station clerk testified that he had been instructed how to
activate the camera. During the robbery,
he did so while emptying the cash register
of the money. The clerk further testified
that he knew the camera was operating
because of motor sounds and soft clicks
coming from the camera. The police detective who had installed the crime-eye camera
at the gas station testified that the camera
was operating properly. He further testified that if the camera was activated, an
alarm went off at the police dispatch office.
Since installation, the camera had been activated and the alarm had gone off only
twice: once on November 6 and once on
December 31. The first time, on November
6. the detective had returned to the gas
station, reloaded the camera, and reset it.
Trior to resetting the can,era, the detective
made several exposures of his own face on
the first few frames of the film to ensure
that the camera was operating properly.
The contact print of the film taken from
the camera on the night of December 31
shows the face of the detective in the first
fevs frames, then the photos identified as
th' se of defendant. Additional testimony
was adduced from sevt ral officers which
established the rh.iin of custody of the film
and subsequently dr\t ]'•;•'d photographs.
The tr.al ju'ij/e admitted the j !.• •tn^ra.phs.
T;.t re are two basic theories upon which
}h •'.••graphic evidence is admitted: the "silt nt witness" theory and the "pictorial testimony" theory.21 I'nder the first theory,
pr^p'.rly authenticated photographs are "silt, nt witnesses" that speak for themselves
and constitute independent, substantive evidence of what they portray, independent of
a sr-onsoring witness." I'nder the "pictorial testimony" theory, the photographic evidence is illustrative of a witness's testimony ard only Incomes admissible wht n a
k I T ! '.V cd c . ; p ! r ' £ 4). 3 J W t ^ n o r c , E w
Ucr..c $ r>J <ChuJ'»> .^n rc\. 1^70).
22

U

S.r u!><> r-.:ted

Sulci

v

G

?re.

'*
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sponsoring witness can testify that it is &
fair and accurate representation of the subject matter based on that witness's personal observation. 0
The photos introduced at trial were introduced under the second theory. The clerk
was shown two photographs taien by the
surveillance camera and a>'\ed if each constituted a fair and accurate representation
of the individual who con-.mir.ed the robber}', both the person and the clothes he
was wearing. The clerk replied thai those
photos were the robber in the act cf robbing the station. Thus, the photos were
authenticated by the testimony of a witness
with knowledge that the photos were what
they claimed to be: : < photos of defendant
robbing the gas station.25

on the cross-examination coiiJd reasonably
be expected to have a substantial effect on
the jury's decision." Testimony a£ to how
the camera was activated could not reasonably be expected to have had a substantial
effect on the jury's decision in the face of
the clerk's testimony that the photographs
depicted the man who robbed the station in
the act, the clerk's personal identification
of defendant as the man in the photo, and
the foundational testimony authenticating
the photographs. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion.
Defendant's conviction is reversed and
the case remanded for a new trial in accordance with this opinion.
STEWART and HOWE, J J , concur.

[8] The right to confrontation irr'udes
the right to cross -examine witnesses.^*
However, this right is rot absolute. The
trial court has discretion in limiting the
scope and extent of cros.--t \..T.*nation.r
Absent an abuse of that d:>:rvt:on. this
Court will not diV.urb the ruling.
Defendant's counsel had ample or-j-ortunity to cross-examine the gas station clerk
concerning the accuracy of hii memory of
the individual robber and chthes. w i t h e r
in fact the clerk did activate the cc.Ttra.
and how he knew it was net:vat?-d. Defendant took full advantn^t of that ep;«ortunity. Defendant aSo hr.i tht. o:, . rtunity to cross-examine the p h.e c-.tr ;: ; . v n:;d
officers who testify i cor.ccrr .r.j t>-. 5uru-illance camera. The cn'.y q-—: •. defendant was not a!:;vt-d to a-k v..• 5. r.~w
specifically the can.era WAS activated

ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (Concurring Separately).
I join in the Court's reversal of the conviction of defendant Hygh. fThe impoundmer.t a^d search of defendant's automobile
**!^:!c-d hi* right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, as guaranteed
ty the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution and by article I t section
14 of the Utah Constitution. However, 1
car.i.ot agree with two assumptions implicit
in the majority opinion: first, that the
scrr^> of the v.arrant requirement under
article I, section 14 is congruent with that
d«wh;- J by the federal courts under the
fr'.irth ;.::*e.v!ment; st o n d . that the remedv It-r a
arch and
\:<, 1 - * THon of I'bh'
;.re \rs .i>ion is the same as th e rt :u edv
fv-r a \." -!-.t:-»n of t h e fi .!
proviMonch:> >r. of t h e e\ i-.ience s e i r e d .

f*. 101 A vj>.?a *..?". 0
ause
dot •s not 0.. c -J r L .i^> the lir.iuti.
cl

7?.e A uYra/ Jaw r e g a r t / i n g w a r r a n t l e s s
S e a r c h e s a n d s e i z u r e s h a s b e c o m e a laby-

23l.

26. Cvxis v. Alaska. 415 VS. 30S, 316-17. 94 S.Ct.
U05. 1110-11, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974).

Si+pra T\<>\C 2 1 .

24. 5Uc L'fiiicd Ststcs » Afj.V^r. 439 fS.p?
103.
105 (L.D.Pa 1977). KSic*. 7 K:'k \?p a: 6. 643
SW.?d at c 74; /V pU x /Y —.. *0 CV App.3d
60S. 131 Ca! R p r . T - ' ! - \ M
25. The photo^r^p! s \+:rc r.:' , " - 7 "fJ to be
in:n*du*cd under the "s > - ' v». ~rs*" thr\»ryj|f
The 1.'-re, v.c t », :
lution of thjs jv*.r

27. Ckz~:bcn v. Mississippi 410 VS. 284. 295. 93
SCi. 103!. 1045-46, 35 LEd.2d 297 (1973).
2A. Lr :cd S:cres v. Famswnh.
729 F 76 11S8.
11*2 (5:h C:r.l^ = 4). H»hha v Fcines. 641 F.2d
?>:. -~"2i«:h C.r.19S1)
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rinth of rules built upon a series of contradictor}* and confusing rationalizations and
distinctions. Police officers and judges attempting to make their way through this
labyrinth often imperil both the rights of
individuals and the integrity and effectiveness of law enforcement See, e.g., Wermiel, Recent Rulings Leave Police More
Confused About lllict's Legal, Wall StJ.,
August 9, 19S5, at 1, col. 1. In many cases,
the exclusionary rule, adopted by the federal courts as the sole remedy for fourth
amendment violations, appears to have influenced, if not controlled, the scope of the
constitutional right it was designed to further. Many of the arcane rules developed
to justify warrantless searches seem to
have been fashioned solely to avoid the
consequences of the exclusionary rule.
Sound arguments may be made in favor
of positions at ^variance with the current
federal law respecting both the scope of
the individual's right to be free from warrantless searches and seizures and the remedy for any violation of that right Acceptance by this Court of such arguments under the Utah Constitution's search and seizure provision might result in simpler rules
that can be more easily followed by police
officers and the courts. At the same time,
these rules might provide the public with
greater and more consistent protection
against unreasonable searches arid * enures
by eliminating many of the confusing exceptions to the warrant requirement that
have been developed in recent years. 1
One way to impro\e predictability might
be to sharply limit the sweep of e \ n p t i ns
Recently, the United States Supreme C art has
attempted to provide police with re!..: \c\\ clear
standards for warranties* ai::"rr.. b.lc searches
b\ vutrp-n^ ; i \ u \ n.ans of the *uh:ic and inconsistent rules that £>verned this area. In
Inited States v. /?mj, 456 t'-S. 79S, 102 S.CL
2157, 72 lid 2d 572 (1*?2). the Court held that
if police off iters law-full) vop a vehicle, ihcy
may conduct a warrantless search of all compartments and cr>n*i:r.cr* within the vehicle if
t)ic\ h.ivt probable cause to bc!.e\c that cor.trab.i.-.d is o-n.rj'-.d v/rr.-ewr.efe ir. the car. In my
\ ; i w , this belated attc rr.pl to bring cc.nsistency
^nd coherence to aut'>~ -< b:'e vrarches fails xxc.r.r.c it c»v.:::,j!!;, fc^:s the f< -r:h amendment'*
w.»rr.:n! ft^ .:r;::::rt as it ;<:*....;.'. ;«j i«:. ::;o
Kle uarc hes. Sec 4«f> I S at f27. 102 S Ct at

to the warrant requirement that often raise
questions of police overreaching. In their
place, clear-cut rules could be adopted—for
example, a flat requirement that a warrant
must be obtained before any nonconsensual search of property not in the immediate
physical control of a suspect is conducted.1
Such a rule would be an improvement over
present law, both for the individual and for
the police. The individual would be assured that, in most cases, his property
would not be searched or seized unless th^
r e a s o n for the search or seizure have first
been presented to a neutral magistrate and
a warrant issued At the same time, police
officers would not be forced to speculate
about what may or may not be subject to
search without a warrant f? Warrantless
searches would be permitted only where
they satisfy their traditional justification 1
to protect the safety of officers or to prevent the destruction of evidence,. Sec, e.g.\
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762C3, S9 S.Ct. 2034, 2039-40, 23 L.Ed.2d G85
(1969). Once the threat that the suspect
will injure the officers with concealed
weapons or will destroy evidence is gone,
there is no persuasive reason why the officers cannot take the time to secure a warrant
.Such a requirement would present little
irr:p-.dijiiUit to police investigations, especially in !;^'ht of ihc ease with which warrant^ can be o! •.-i.v-'d under Utah's telephonic warrant ^.:ute, U.C.A., U»53, § 7723-4(2) (19S2 t-d.i See Suite r. L*vczy
,Ulah, C7G P.2d :^3 (ll^-i).' I\ .-haps most
*:..] > rtar,t!y, .-jeh a r\i)e could be readily
2174 (Marshall, ].. dis cntir.g) There is little
reason to believe that effective law cnfoi ccn»cnt
u quires this sacrifice of the interests protected
by the w^riunt requirement. Set, e.g., The Supreme C(,urt—!9S! Term, 96 Harv.L.Rcv. 176,
184-85 (19S2).

1.

2,

Immediate physical control" refers to an area
within which a supped could reasonably be
expected to grab a weapon or destroy evidence
during an eiaountcr wan r* hce officers. The
exception would be limited by its justification
and would not ^.i.c-ally permit warrantless
search's <'f car trunks, for example, or containers bevund the s-.i-; . J s rtuch.
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understood and complied with by police officers, and evidence uncovered in compliance with it would more than satisfy the
requirements of the fourth amendment to
the federal constitution.

Constitutional Theory and State Courts,
IS Ga.L.Rev. 165 (1984); see also Massachusetts r. Upton, 104 S.Ct 20S5, 20S9-91
(19S4) (Stevens, J., concurring).

Sound arguments can also be made
against acceptance of the federal version of
the exclusionary rule as the sole remedy
for unlawful searches and seizures. See
ycncrally Coe, The A.L.I
Substantiality
Test: A Flexible Approaeh to the Exclusionary Sanction, 10 Ga.L.Rev. 1 (1975);
Schroeder, Deterring Fourth
Amendment
Violations: Alteniath^es to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 Geo.LJ. 1361 (1951). Although this Court has tacitly followed the
federal lead on this matter, I have found no
case in which this Court has decided to
adopt the exclusionary rule after independently analyzing the question of what remedy is available for an unlawful search or
seizure under our state constitution. Perforce, this Court has never considtred the
appropriateness of possible exceptions to
the exclusionary rule or the a v a i l a b l y of
alternative or supplemental remedies, such
as the imposition of civil liability on police
officers.

DURHAM, J., concurs in the concurring
opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J.

I do not suggest that without further
consideration this Court should either
adopt the hypothetical warrantless search
and seizure rule discussed above or reject
the exclusionary rule as a remedy for violations of article I, section 14. I only contend
that such arguments should not be foreclo.-ed from con [deration by our ur..analyzed acceptance of the federal f-.-i'Jon.
The federal law as it currentlv c\:-:> is
in*.t rt recertainly not the only permi.-sil
tation of the .M-.irch and s<.!~-re pro! «••.""» >ns
contained in the Utah C«'r.-t::uti.»n J If.

after consideration, we concluie
v>e
can strike a balance between th<- cc~:> tinp
interests involved so as to U t u r f e n e
them all, then we should not hesitate to do
so. Sec generally Linde, E Plurih:.s —
3.

Developing a j a r i s p r u J c n c c of state c c - * n t u tior.a* law is not a novel idea.. For cxarrp!?. ihc
state of W a s h i n g t o n has i n t e r p r e t J ;t c
<: t j
(;
In/."..:! • -:/vh and seizure pre s;* •• ~< d
?'t~.\l\
t h - n the United States S-p:c:r.e C ,..rt h - • .;.:erpretrd the f u ^ . i h arr.ei.d
•it 5 . 7 N -/» Ssiz-

k-EflSrSTlM>

MUNICIPAL BUILDING AUTHORITY
OF IRON COUNTY, Utah, a Utah nonprofit corporation, and Iron County, a
body corporate and politic, Plaintiffs
and Respondents,
•.

Dennis LOWDER, individually and as
county auditor of Iron County; and
Clair Mulct, individually and as county
clerk of Iron County, Defendants and
Appellants,
No. 19959.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 27, 1985.
County and its municipal building authority% brought action agninst county officials. Seeking declarator)- rel; .f . : i v. rit of
n;ar.i..rr,us to compel count> (• f f i " i a h to
earn - out their alleged duti in cur meet ion
with county's plan for financing cun.-truction of new jail facility. The District
Court, Iron County, George E. Ballif, J.,
upheld actions of county, and the county
officials appealed. The Supreme Court,
Zimmerman, J., held that: (1) debt of municipal housing authority for which county
was rot responsible was not subject to debt
ir

i

l

7 / ^ i r ' - r : ; ' > . S^jrihin^ for Theory. Article I,

St.-::j*
7. 8 V. Pu t -ci $<rj~d L R c v . 331 ( 1 9 5 5 ) .
TJ.ej»'.^:c c f A ! J ' I a has also c o n s t r u e d its search
a " i v . ; j r c p r o v i s i o n to provide \ • •. ivr protect. rv Frr.cj, %.'S:.:te. Ah '• 3. f'., V ?d 727. 734
(2*?3)
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Second, the damage done by seizures pursuant thereto, are prima facie
wrongly deciding this case and encourag- reasonable.
ing more ex-spouses to bring on baseless
attempts to change custody far outweighs 2. Searches and Seizures <s=>3.5, 3.7
Dedsion. to seize must be judicial, as
any harm to the Shioji children that would
-apposed
to administrative, and search war-*
attend a reversal. We cannot let the fact
^rant
must
be'. sulfki^^;;' ; partira
tx*
that these proceedings have dragged on
guide
officer
to
thing
intended
to
be
seized,
dictate the law we enunciate or the resultdanger of unwarranted
we reach. Custody of the children should thereby minimizing
inv!t5fmf"ofLprivacy.,
be returned to appellant.
challenge.

DURHAM, Justice, concurs in the dissenting opinion of Justice ZIMMEKMAN.

KfYNUMBtRSYSU

^

The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Ross GALLEGOS. Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 203 49.
Suprvme Court of Utah.
Nov. 29, 1985.

3. Searches and Seizures «s=*3.7
Line between what is and what is not
sufficiently particular in search warrant
must be drawn with a view to accomplishment of constitutional purpose of minimizing danger of unwarranted invasion of privacy and necessarily varies with circumstances and with nature of property to be
seized.
4. Searches and Seizures <s=>3.7
Without
substantial
justification,
search warrants describing property only
in generic terms are not favored by the
law.
5. Searches and Seizures <3=>7(8)
Fojuctf* Amendment r^ufreliiffl^'ti^l
iteijSeM^rseucS b* particularly describfd
uggg^jPHjSHiii^
$v^w,ft?¥ft n t
HOBS required seizure of all " s k ^ n prop

Defendant was convict' d in the Utah
District Court, J. Robert Bullock, J., of
theft by receiving, and he appealed. The
Supreme Court, Hall, C.J., held that. (1)

6. Searches and Seizures <e=>3.8<2)
Assuming that affidavit by police officer was properly incorporated into March
warrant, and thus, validated gener ! description pro\ ided in warrant,
«attnorwrtmiract4>e<»£

€nUr defStittnit1riNM«^.lteed
ifai march warrant and w**»fc*-ffc«»w* initK
sts and conclude independent outside fnve$~

awn chairs, electrical wiring, and
children's :>vvtng as "stolen property."

Order denying motion to suppress r e
versed and case remanded.
1. Searches and Seizures C=7(5)
Search of c>;»>titutionally protected
area pursuant to valid search warrant, and

7. Searches and Seizures C=3.8(2)
When, in coursejf^j^<ffMin£Jb*far
Xirrhiiflr frinwrHitcrt on warrant, offkenr
'mime across other articles of incriminatory"*
Wtinrerihat "property ' may be proprrljr'
seized tyjder p |
8. Searches and Seizures c=>3.3(4)
Y Warrantless seizure of property in
plain view after lawful intrusion i- justified

/%~t^n

^
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if officer is lawfully present where search
and seizure occur, e\ idence is in plain \ lew,
and evidence is clearly incriminating

asked her to verify this information with
Norton's. Norton's assistant manager advised the dispatcher that Norton's had not
rented the VCR based on the fact that
9. Searches and Seizures 0 3 8(1)
there was no rental contract on file under
the
name of Gallegos or Gallegos' girl
upjn search warrant and while
fr
end
This inquir> took from ten to fifaO^ and conclude independent o u t s a i l v esteen
minutes
After receiving this infortigation to obtain probable cause t*f*^eize
mation,
Geshson
examined the VCR and
nnnamed property, particularly where
discovered
that
the
serial number was
loQung about the nature or
mining
When
the
defendant
and his girlacter of property <*eizf d that
friend
were
unable
to
produce
a rental reL ^4Aeww*tlirMentifrable m being
ceipt
for
the
VCR,
Geshson
seized
the VCR
sjtplen,
and the tapes A review of the record
indicates that none of the property indiRandall Gaither, Salt Lake City, for de- cated as being stolen in the affidavit was
fendant and appellant
seized by the officers
David L Wilkinson, Atty Gen , Sandra
The following day, Geshson called severL Sjogren, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and
al scores in the Provo area, trying to deterrespondent
mine if the VCR was in fact stolen Even
tuallv
ownership of the VCR and tapes
HALL, Chief Justice
wa> triced to Sounds Easv, an audio-video
A jury found the defendant Ross Gallestore which reported them stolen from a
gos, guilty of the crime of theft bv recedcustomer's truck
ing,1 a third degree felony On appeal, the
Trior to trial, the defendant made a modefendant seeks a reversal of the trial
court order denving his motion to suppress tion to suppress evidence of tht discow H*
evidence and for a new trial
of the VCR and the tapes in him home on
the grounds that the sei/ure exceeded the
I.
scope of the warrant and that the plain
Mew doctrine was not applicable The trial
On July 17, 1984, Pro\o City police offi
cers went to Gallegos' home in Pro\o to judge seems to h iv * igrc« d but denied the
execute a search warrant The w irrant motion based on the St IU s aigument
ordered seizure of "all controlled sub- ^^y^^^^
*&$**& iiiarOffie^r^Oesbstances and stolen property " \ n affidmt •pon, whHr fawfttlhr in the defendant's
in support of issuance of the warrant stat
Home, initiated an independent in?* stiga
ed that an "informant did ste within the jfcion which"provided the officer with proba
last 48 hours at least one pound of manjua
M e - ^ i f t J f t seize t h ^ ¥ C ^ a ^ <«gHB^I>
na and several items proported [MC] b> IWM^^&trir
m ide the same argument
Gallegos to be stolen
(lawn chairs elec
during the defendant's tnal, and the detncal wiring, children's swing, etc)" at fendant was found guilty of theft b> r e
Gallegos' home
ceiving
While searching the home, Officer Craig
Geshson noticed a Magnavox VCR, atII
tached to a television set, and two video
At
the
outset,
it
is
important to note that
tapes close by He asked Gallegos about
them and Gallegos remarked that he had this Court will not disturb the ruling of the
rented them from Norton's suj>ennarket. tral c urt on questions of idrnissibility of
Geshson call* d the police dispatcher and e> i ^ • unless it cl< trlv appears that the
lT C A

Wl

§ 76-6 40S (S i?p 19&S)
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lower court was in error. 2 Accordingly,
this Court may affirm the trial court's decision to admit evidence on any proper
grounds, even though the trial court assigned another reason for its ruling.3
Therefore, we must address whether the
VCR was seized within the scope of the
warrant and, if not, whether its seizure
was justified by an exception to the fourth
amendment's warrant requ'rement
HL-The foiiltb amendment protects peov

person, jwrafc papery ggd

••BHHSai^iS^^
proscriptions
apply with equal force to the states. 5 A
search of a constitutionally protected area,
as was the case here,* pursuant to a valid
search warrant, and seizures pursuant
thereto, are prima facie reasonable.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the defendant appears to have conceded that since the officers entered the
premises pursuant to a search warrant
there was a valid entry and search.7
Therefore, the only issue in this case is
whether the seizure of the tapes and the
VCR was justified under the fourth amendment.
[2,3] The State first argues that the
property seized was within the scope of the
warrant. The fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution requires that
"no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, s ^W£ r i££^fa||£tfjfe^ affirmation, andjt^K///KKP&&Tfo*&fc
the . . .
things to Be seized." This portion of the
2.

State v. Cole, Ulah, 674 P.2d 119, 122 {\9%l).

3.

See State v. Bryan, Utah. 709 P.2d 257, 260
(1985).

4.

[4, 5] In this case, the warrant ordered
seizure of "all controlled substances and
stolen property." ^Without substantia* ja»
tification, warrantS*" **ttescriWng VropertV
< ory in generic terms (terms applicable to
*a entire classjjfjjWJpwty) arc" not favored
by* th? Taw.t1 However, use of such descriptions has been allowed when a more
specific description of the things to be
seized is unavailable. Thus, general descriptions have been held .sufficient
[i]n cases involving contraband, such as
drugs. . . . [i]n cases where the inherent
nature of the property sought by a warrant precludes specific description....
[in rases] where attendant circumstances
prevented a detailed description from being given.... and [in cases where a]
detailed description has been difficult
and the evidence established that the stosionary rule.
— U.S.
(1984).

State v. Kent, 20 Utah 2d i, 5. 432 P.2d 64. 66
(1967).

6.

See Katz v. United States, 3^* U.S. 347. 351 n.
8. 356. 88 S.Ct. 507. 511 n. S, 514, 19 L.Fd 2d 5 7 ^
(1967); State v. Folkes, Utah. 565 V 2d 1125.
1127, cert, denied. 434 VS Q71 $* S O ' ? \ 54
!..Ed.2d 461 (1977).
Because of counsel's conccsvnr \»
address the gcx*d faith exception tc

See Massachusetts v. Shippard,
104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737

8.

State v. Tidyman, 30 Or.App. 537, 568 P.2d
666, 670 (1977) {citing Marron v. United States,
275 U.S. 192. 196, 48 S.Ct. 74, 76, 72 L.Rd. 231
(1927)).

9.

See. e.g., United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730,
733 (5th Cir.1981).

Sec U.S. Const, amend IV.

5.

7.

amendment is essentially a proscription
against general warrants whereby administrative officers determine what is and what
is not to be seized. The decision to seize
must be judicial, as opposed to adrmwsW
Jive, and the warrant must be sufficiently
particular to guide the officer to the thing
intended to be seized, thereby minimizing^
the danger of unwarranted invasion uf jrivacy** Accordingly, the Tine between what
is and what is not sufficiently particular
must be drawn with a view to accomplishment of the constitutional purpose 9 and
necessarily varies with the circumstances
and with the nature of the property to be
seized.10

10. See People v. Harmon. 90 l!I.App.3d 753. 755,
4^ HI.Dec. 27, 29, 413 N f-.2d 467, 469 (1980).
N\t- ulso State v. Tnv.nsend, 394 F.Supp. 736,
74<V47 (f. D.Mich.1975).

- ':• J not
11.

See Cttok. 6s7 F.2d at 733
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len goods sought are likely to be part of
a larger collection of similar contraband
located at the premises to be searched11
?re£ogiuze<l except
the order reqt
_. "1t!s ob\>
fr^ti«^ffWsrfiN»#W^^:ularly
s abridged in this email*
[6] It has been held thanrgraeifal description on the face of a warrant may be
cured by proper incorporation of a sufficiently descriptive supporting affidavit11
Assuming, without deciding, that the affidavit by Officer Eagan was properly incorporated and thus validated the general description on the warrant the seizure of the
VCR and the tapes was still not within the
scope of the warrant; the affidavit lists
only "lawn chairs, electrical wiring, children's swing, etc."-as being stolen property.
III.
17] The State alternatively argues that
the tapes and the VCR were properly
sefc' d pursuant to the plain view doctrine.
Ordinarily, only items described in a search
' ,r ant may be seized.15 However, when,
r. tl e cour*e of performing a lawful search
f<<r items li-ted on a warrant, officers come
across other articles of an incriminatory
hV'»r-. 'hat property may be prpj-erly
1 nder th«

trine merely provides grounds for seizure
of an item when access to an object is
properly justified under the fourth amendment The owner's only remaining inter*
ests are those of possession and ownership.11
[SJ Because this Court is sensitive to
the inherent danger that officers will use
the plain view doctrine to enlarge specific
authorization to seize into a general warrant to rummage, we have previously
adopted a^aodified wrston of tilt guidelffffi laJTifowB in Coolidgc p. New Hamfh
skirt*** J&usr V" warrantless seizure of
property in plain view after a lawful intrusion is justified if: "(1) the officer j f BStfSI
l|W 'pllSJtll^ Where the search anaseizure
occur;" ff^ evidence is^Hrpltitt Vfew; and
(3) the evidence is clanrij incriminating,;, *
There is no questioJf^at^ffie'XOT? and
tapes were in plain view and, a- »•<-.• ed
above, the defendant conceded tha» : « officers were lawfully present. The •»• r» »d
ant, however, argues that the incrim*i;a;ur>
nature of the property was not "immediately apparent" This language from Coolidgc is in substance contained in the third
requirement noted abo\e tlat the evidence
be "cliarly incri;ni^iating.M^fhr^l«rtJ^|cjjiiiiiiiitingi^ii!qiwrcwictit' also mJaJ^Ies
*ktt officers have probable eause to associate thcjyQI*^^
iKlivitx

l i proposition that wt
j^tn \ ^ v t h ^ ^ p g g i i S a r t } am* ndrnent
^rdmgly, in actuality the doe-

{9J The .-cope of this r< juirernent must
be determined by balancing the intrusion
on fourth arrundm* nt interests against the
pn>n -?ti.>n of legitimate >» .ernmental in

!2. Samen v. Suit, Alalia App.. 665 P 2d <57.
*6J-',2 ( P ? 3 ) (n.-»in<»tr* or.. Med).

16. &r
(1053).

13. S c Xjrr.en. ^ 5 P 2 J at <*2-A?. k':Kry \
Sun: (HI Crim . t-02 V2d 240. 242 (197^). 2 W.
!-i lave. Search and St : ^ r e § 4.6(c). at 102
(!97«). See also lx>Jt Sales. Inc. v. AV* York,
442 U S 319. °<> SCt. 2319. 60 LXd 2d 920
(1979).

17. S*-e State \ Martinez, 2} I'lah 2d 62. 6^
457 T2d 613. 615 n. 5 (1969).

c

V

v.

Romero,

660

P 2d

715,

;i«

V

IS. See TeiJU v. frown, 460 V.S 730. 7 ^. 103
SCt. ! r ™ . 1541. 7< I I'd 2d 502 (l''S3).

14. See 2 W U Fuvc. S ^ - v h and Sci.-ore
§ 4 * \ i ) . a: K>0 n. 23 (ic?< L v . r p
m*).

19. 403 I S
U^71).

13. S--e St~:e i Cnj/in. I uh. <2c T 2d 47*. 4<2
(19M) ( W d t m v J c :.. : - > ' ) .

20K 5 s:e \ £.<•:, >o I !uh. 6^» 1* 2d .«' 71 h (' *.t

- \- *

443, 91 SCt

J).

2)22. 29 I Id 2d **4

STATE v . KNOLL

Utah

211

CUe ** 712 PJid 211 (Utah 1985)

terests. 21 The State of course has a valid
interest in gathering and seizing evidence
of criminal activity in order to suppress the
lawless element of our society. However,
iW-pubik1 iiad- i h * right t& be fret from
unreasonable seizures by the SUte^ A1
f$i0tfp***f#«^
the
"clearly incriminating" requirement as requiring that evidence be "clearly incriminating" at first glance,22 to allow police to
conduct an off-premises investigation to establish probable cause to seize property not
designated in the search warrant is clearly
unacceptable under the fourth amendment.
Here, Officer Geslison testified that at
the time he first saw the VCR he had no
information that the video recorder had
been stolen. The record indicates that Officer Geslison only had reasonable suspicion to believe that the recorder was stolen
after having a dispatcher follow up the
defendant's claim that he rented the machine from Norton's. At trial. Officer
Mock testified that the inquiry through the
police dispatcher took from ten to fifteen
minutes. Officer Geslison's subsequent
discovery of the missing identification number and discovery the next day that the
property was in fact stolen, did not dissipate thlFWBW|^^Byi Affirmance of this
type of police'investigation would have the
proscribed effect of allowing police to
search under a general warrant.
based upon 8 search warrant and Vhtie
there initiate and conclude an indepci«kat
outside investigation lo achieve probable
cause to seize unnamed property*%*?Xj£?'t£
partrcuTafT>^true in a* case *"'strdr4ttr this
when nothing about the nature or physical
character of the property seized rendered it
inherently identifiable as being stolen.

STATE of Utah,, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Paul Leo KNOLL, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 18857.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 3, 1985.

Defendant was convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Bryant C.
Croft. J., of manslaughter, and he appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held
that: (1) self-defense instruction was proper, and (2) evidence was sufficient to support finding that defendant had not acted
in self-defense.
Affirmed.

1. Homicide <£=37
Absence of self-defens*- is not cue of
the prima facie elements of homicide. U.C.
A.1953, 76-2-401, 76-2-402, 76-5-201. 765-205.
2. Homicide 0 2 1 K 3 )
Although self-defense is a defense in
fiomicide prosecution, procedural rules that
govern its pleading and proof are largely
influenced by constitutional requirements
"that State must prove criminal act beyond
a reasonable doubt. U.C.A.1953, 76-2-402.

STEWART, HOWE, DURHAM ana ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.

3. Homicide <s=>244(3)
Defendant is not required to establish
defense of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt, or even by preponderance of
the evidence; thus, jury may acquit even
thoy^h evidence of self-defense fell far
sh>rt of establishing justification or excuse
b\ a preponderance of the evidence upon
t:.e subject. U.C.A 1953, 7(>-2-4u2.

21. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 L'.S MS 6M OQ
S.Ct. 1391, 13%. 59 L.Ed Id ttO (1979).

22. S<e Texas v. Bmwn.
S.Ct. at 1542.

jppress
Id the case is remanded for a new
trial.

4<s0 I S

at 74!, 103
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[5] Even if her constitutional rights
were not violated, Brisebois contends that
she was prejudiced by the mid-trial amendment. CrR 2.1(d) states:
The court may permit any information
to be amended at any time before verdict
or finding if substantial rights of the
defendant are not prejudiced.
The defendant bears the burden of showing
prejudice. State v. Jones, 26 Wash.App. 1,
6, 612 P.2d 404 (1980); State v. Eaton, 24
Wash.App. 143, 600 P.2d 632 (1979).
[6,7] In evaluating prejudice, the court
must determine if the defendant was misled or surprised. State v. Brown, 74
Wash.2d 799, 801, 447 P.2d 82 (1968).
Here, the trial court determined that neither was the case. The State provided
Brisebois with discovery outlining the
State's witnesses' testimony. Much of this
material involved Brisebois' actions prior to
September 1979. The amended information did not require Brisebois to defend
against any additional allegations. Nor
was Brisebois required to rebut additional
testimony. The trial court ruled correctly.
Finally, Brisebois argues that the statute
of limitations barred prosecution for all
conduct occurring before November 1979.
The statute of limitations for theft is 3
years. RCW 9A.04.080. Brisebois argues
that if the State was properly limited to
proving those acts that fell within the statute of limitations period, the State would
not be able to prove Brisebois took more
than $1,500.
[S-10] Neither statute nor case law
supports this contention. RCW 9A.56.010(12)(c) provides:
Whenever any series of transactions
which constitute theft, would, when considered separately, constitute theft in the
third degree because of value, and said
series of transactions are a part of a
common scheme or plan, then the transactions may be aggregated in one count
Whether successive takings constitute a
single larceny is a question of fact for the
jury. State v. Vining, 2 Wash.App. 802,

S09, 472 P.2d 564, 53 A.L R.3d 390 (1970).
Brisebois neither argued at trial nor maintains on appeal that her crime was not
continuous. "[When a] crime is continuous^] [t]he crime is not completed until the
continuing criminal impulse [is] terminated." State v. Carner, 36 Wash.App. 755,
758, 677 P.2d 768 (1984). The statute of
limitations does not begin to run until the
crime is completed. State v. Carrier, supra. Here, the crime was completed in
1980, well within the 3-year statute of limitations.
The judgment and sentence is affirmed.
SCHOLFIELD and WARD WILLIAMS,
J J., concur.

/?v~

^

39 Wash.App. 136

STATE of Washington, Respondent,
v.
Lisa L. DRESKER (Lindquist) and
Richard Lindquist, Appellants.
No. 5716^111-0.
Court of Appeals of Washington,
Division 3.
Dec. 11, 19S4.
Defendants were convicted in the Superior Court, Grant County, James D. Kendall, J., of manufacturing controlled substance, and they appealed. The Coun of
Appeals, Thompson, J., held that officers'
entry into defendants' residence wFV^it
a#esl e f f i e a ; ^

e^tiiiiiiiw

"^HBBtg

Reversed.
1. Arrest ^68.5(4)
In absence of consent or exigent circumstances, arrest warrant is required to

STATE v. DRKSKKR
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Cite as 692 P.2d 546 (Wash.App. 19S4)

enter suspect's home to make criminal arrest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4

\\ her^&^ficerS-iiaji,no more than suspicion
^BCWA'10.31.100.

2. Searches and Seizures <S=>7(29)
State has burden of establishing that
consent to search was in fact freely and
voluntarily given. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
4.

Harry E. Ries, Ries & Kenison, Moses
Lake, for appellants.

3. Searches and Seizures <3^7(27)
w
t*ijjT JJaQiJli. j)jijjI'Mjii jift ijhfrnHqrt' s

Paul A. Klasen, Jr., Pros. Atty., Mary
Ann Brady, Deputy Pros. Atty., Ephrata,
for respondent.
THOMPSON, Judge.

U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
4. Criminal Law £^1139
While findings of trial court following
suppression hearing were of great significance, constitutional rights at issue in defendant's claim of illegal search and seizure required Court of Appeals to make
independent evaluation of evidence.
5. Searches and Seizures €--3.3(1)
Mere possibility d

cientjggg^
fleeing ,^y&gfi6^dii2M^«<*¥^--^dditional rele-

vm^fmm^W^f^^^deredy

includ-

ing gravity of offense committed, belief
that suspect is armed, and likelihood that
suspect would escape in absence of swift
police action. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
6. Arrest <^68.5(4)

vt**}jm*mm 'iWJW^iagatf'mcr^ belief
thaU

7. Arrest e==63.4(3)
posel

li§R&v#d.

8. Arrest £>68.5(4)
O f f i c e r s J ^ ^ f ^ ^ g ^ ^ o ent^r defendant's r f f l ^ ^ ^
r:

Richard Lindquist and Lisa Dresker
Lindquist were convicted under the lTniform Controlled Substances Act, RCW 69.50, of manufacturing a controlled substance. On appeal they contend the trial
court erred in refusing to suppress evidence seized at their residence. We reverse.
This case arose out of a prenuptial wedding reception held in honor of the Lindquists' forthcoming June wedding. Sergeant Cleve Schuchman of the Grant County sheriffs office received a radio message
that a large party was taking place at the
Lindquist mobile home located approximately a mile outside the city of Quincy.
Sergeant Schuchman arrived at the Lindquist residence about 9:30 p.m. the evening
of May 22, 1382, and observed 40 to 50
vehicles parked in the area. He testified
he associated some of the vehicles with
minors. The party was loud and he saw
people wandering about the premises with
beer bottles and drinking cups in their
hands.
Sergeant Schuchman returned to the
Quincy Police Department and organhed
additional police officers for the purpose of conducting a raid. As Sergeant
Schuchman testified at the suppressions
hearing, "I felt at that point we had probable cause to go into the residence to check,
to see if in fact they were drinking". In^
organizing the raid, the officers, anticipating that their arrival would precipitate the
rapid departure of some partygoers, developed a plan of containment whereby some
deputies were directed to go directly into
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the Lindquist residence and others were to
go directly to the garage area. Sergeant
Schuchrnan elected to remain on the road
near the residence.
The seven police officers arrived at the
residence and proceeded directly to their
assigned tasks. Deputy Schultz stated
that as he approached the front door of the
mobile home he could see through the front
window what appeared to be minors in the
residence with beer bottles and paper cups
in their hands. At or near the front door,
Deputy Schultz testified he met Richard
Lindquist and the deputy stated, "let's step
inside the residence." Mr. Lindquist made
no reply and the deputy continued on into
the home.

[1]

T ^ ^

had a right to be, Slate v. Chrisrnan, 100
Wash.2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984), then

After entering the mobile home, the deputies segregated the people, directing the
adults to remain in the mobile home and
directing persons under 21 out into the
garage. Some of the deputies then proceeded to write citations to the adults remaining in the dining room area while other deputies wandered about the home looking in rooms and closets for additional suspects. Some 15 to 30 minutes after their
arrival, Deputy Schultz noticed a tray on
top of a buffet in the dining room area.
The tray^ conj^ed---4fiaij^fiA^3geds and,

adopting Pay!on v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 629 (1980);
State v. Teuher, 19 Wash.App. 651, 577
P.2d 147 (1978) (misdemeanor arrest). The
force of this rule is underlined in the Payton decision. That court held the Fourth
Amendment
protects the individual's privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of
privacy more clearly defined than when
bounded by the unambiguous physical
dimensions of an individual's home—a
zone that finds its roots in clear and
specific constitutional terms: 'The right
of the people to be secure in their . . .
houses . .. shall not be violated/' . . .

ties returned to town for a search warrant
while others remained to secure the residence. A search warrant was obtained and
served upon the Lindquists and a subsequent search and seizure produced additional contraband and drug paraphernalia,
most of which was entered into evidence
during trial. After a 2-day hearing on defendants' motion to suppress during which
witnesses testified for both the prosecution
and the defendants, the trial court denied
the motion.

deputies formulated a plan while still at the
Quincy police station whereby the residence would be entered in order to minimize the anticipated rapid departure of partygoers that would be precipitated by the

1. We have not addressed the propriety of the
issuance of the search warrant based on Deputy
Schultz' affidavit nor the scope and intensity of
the subsequent search since no such issues have

been raised on appeal. Our silence should not
be interpreted as either approval or disapproval
of the procedures.

STATE v. DRESKER
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arrival of the police. Deputy Schultz was
on his way into the Lindquist residence
when by happenstance he ran into Mr.
Lindquist. In light of the deputies' previously planned destination, it is obvious his
statement to Mr. Lindquist, "$
SI

m

entef^TcTThe contrary, it was~a"command
to Mr. Lindquist to go back into the residence. Mr. Lindquist's silence and compliance with the command was not consent;
consent was neither sought nor given.
[4-6] In Counts, 99 Wash, at 60, 659
es which could Be termed exigent: (iW*^

determined the State established exigent
circumstances warranting entry into the
residence in order to prevent mass dispersal. We disagree. While the findings of
the trial court following a suppression
hearing are of great significance to a reviewing court, the constitutional rights at
issue require us to make an independent
evaluation of the evidence. State v.
Daugherty, 94 Wash.2d 263, 269, 616 P.2d
649 (1980); State v. Agee, 89 Wash.2d 416,
419, 573 P.2d 355 (1977). The mere possibility of escape is not sufficient under the
fleeing suspect exigency. State v. Coyle,
Additional relevant factors should be considered, including (1) the gravity of the^
offense committed; (2) the belief that the
suspect is armed; and (3) the likelihood
that the suspect would escape in the absence of swift police action. United States
v. Williams, 612 F.2d 735, 739 (3d Cir.
1979), cert denied, 445 U.S. 934, 100 S.Ct.
1328, 63 I,Ed.2d 770 (1980). Here, the
originally contemplated offenses were relatively minor liquor violations with no indication weapons would be present. The
record does not support exigent circumstances sufficient to warrant entry of the
Lindquist home without a warrant.
[7,8] RCW 10.31.100 provides in pertinent part:

A police officer having probable cause
to believe that a person has committed or
is committing a felony shall have the
authority to arrest the person without a
warrant. A police-officer mav urrest a
p e r s o n ^ w i i M & i J ^ r a h t iorxQ.rrunittiner
a mm0&w&W)T,.*M\,rf*u»wwijwqtttfeftfter

pie^^i^^
were
•of-rreeded to enter the Lindquist residence
ince misdemeanors or gross misdemeanors
;sc-re being committed in the presence of
„„___._.
fTfc^Fdo
tfWfsupport the State's contention. Sergeant Sehuehman. at the suppression hearing, indicated he had no more than a suspicion a misdemeanor was being committed.
He stated, after initially observing the vehicles and suspects at the residence, "I felt
at that point we had probable cause to go
into the residence to check to see if in fact
they were drinking."
(Italics ours.) If
minors were not drinking, no crime was
being committed. Additionally, it should
be noted that no one testified at the suppression hearing who the suspect minors
were or who owned the suspect cars.
Without articulating specific facts pertaining to a specific person who is committing
r, 1 ^ ^ ^ f ^ a r S t g e r n i 6 r &
a misdemeanor,

V rv !" llmnriiMl il" j'ULL ?'. Ellison,
r a s n . ^ n r r r r r r ; 467 P.2d S39 (1970).
We conclude the officers' entry into the
Lindquist residence without an arrest or
search warrant was unlawful. Since they
were not in a place they had a right to be,
all evidence seized as a result of their unlawful entry must be suppressed. As noted by the trial judge, the incidence of underage drinking is a source of grave concern for society and police action geared
toward cj^ta^ng this activity is warranted;
nut 1$jfriri^r\g™Tffi
itHht a nnnr IHMH
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Defendants' motion to suppress should
have been granted. Reversed.
FARIS, J. Pro Tern., and McINTURFF,
J., concur.

39 Wash.App. 130

STATE of Washington, Appellant,
v.
Raymond J. OWENS, Respondent.
No. 606S-III-3.
Court of Appeals of Washington,
Division 3, Panel One.
Dec. 11, 1984.
Review Denied Feb. 15, 1085.
The State appealed from order of the
Superior Court, Kittitas County, W R. Cole.
J., suppressing testimony of police officer
and his passenger regarding defendant's
flight from illegal traffic stop. The Court
of Appeals, Mclnturff, J., held that police
officer and his passenger could testify regarding defendant's flight from illegal traffic stop, and it was for trier of fact to
determine whether defendant's actions of
accelerating car and racing through town
at speeds of fifty miles per hour and
through five stop signs were normal and
reasonable reactions to illegal stop.
Vacated and remanded.
1. Arrest e^68(4)
"Seizure" within meaning of Fourth
Amendment occurs when a reasonable person believes he is not free to leave. U.S.
C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
1. RCW 46.16.010 provides in part:

2. Arrest e=>63(4)
In case of automobiles, "seizure" occurs when police officer switches on his
flashing light. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
3. Criminal Law <s=351(3), 737(1)
Police officer and his passenger could
testify regarding defendant's flight from
illegal traffic stop, and it was for trier of
fact to determine whether defendant's actions of accelerating car and racing
through town at speeds of fifty miles per
hour and through five stop >\gns were normal and reasonable reactions to illegal
stop. West's RCWA 46.61.024; U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.
4. Criminal Law ^304(1)
Judicial notice would be taken of fact
that the fifty mile per hour race through
town with disregard for five .-.top signs is
not normal and reasonable relation to illegal stop, but shows complete wanton and
wilful disregard for life and property of
others.
Joseph Panattoni, Prosecuting Atty., Ellensburg, for appellant.
Chelsea C. Korte, Dano, Cone, Fraser &
Gilreath, Ellensburg, for respondent.
McINTURFF, Judge.
The State appeals an order suppressing
the testimony of a police officer and his
passenger regarding Mr. Owens' flight
from an illegal traffic stop. We vacate the
order and remand for trial.
Officer Patrick Woodruff of the Roslyn
police department first ob>cr\ ed a black
and white Chrysler Imperial v\kh Montana
license plates in December 1982, and subsequently on four other o,-oa>lons in January
and February 1983. On March 13, 1983,
although the car was not engaged in any
other illegal activity, the officer attempted
to stop the car, suspecting it was being
operated in violation of the vehicle licensing statute, RCW 46.16.0i0.1 As he apIt shall be unlawful for a person to operate
any 'vehicle over and along a public highway

584

Or.

706 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

did not. On the other hand, the Perrydale
school superintendent testified:
-"[SUPERINTENDENT:] Any change
you make tax dollar wise, in the Perrydale District, it is adversely going to
affect the children in that district.
We're presently under a tax rate limitation law that says we cannot just raise
the tax rate of a district and reapportion
out the costs. So what I'm saying is, if
the $2,000 or $3,000 in taxes from the
Kumley property were removed from the
Perrydale District, we would not be able
to recoup that money; that would be a
loss to our District of that amount.
*
*
*
*
*
*
"CHAIRMAN: If Perrydale is cut
$4,000, say for round figures, then for
the sake of argument, what might be
cut?
"[SUPERINTENDENT]: Oh, we're
looking at half of a teacher's aide perhaps. At this point who knows where
you begin, textbooks? We're right down
to bare bones now, we've had our tax
levy up twice and it's been defeated.
Hopefully, we're going to be able to pay
it so we can open in the fall. It could be
any part of our program."
The Board found that the proposed change
would have a substantial adverse affect
upon the ability of the Perrydale School
District to provide the educational program
required by law, that the record contained
no evidence that the proposed change
meets the criterion in ORS 330.090(2)(a)
and that petitioners failed to carry their
burden to present such evidence. Petitioners' assignment of error is without merit.3
Affirmed.

75 Or.App. 292

STATE of Oregon, Respondent,
v.
Vernon Herman ROBERTS, Appellant.
72256 D.I.; CA A3I830.
Court of Appeals of Oregon.
Argued and Submitted July 15, 1985.
Decided Sept. 18, 1985.

Defendant was convicted in the District Court, Washington County, Michael J.
McElligott, J., of driving under influence of
intoxicants, and he appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Young, J., held that warrantless
entry into defendant's residence to effect
arrest was unreasonable.
Reversed and remanded.

L Searches and Sei/ures £^3.3(1)
"Exigent circumstances^.' ..Justifying
emergency situation requiring 'swiff"action
to prevent imminent danger to life or jeii-

evidence.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. A u t o m o b i l e s < ^ 3 4 9

Need to $eoirj^&&^
°f
driving^uhrfef the m?!^J^^^S , ggg!cants,
that 4 y , ^ r i f e 1 ^
warrantless entry into hor^Itsiat^pT^res
that arresting officers coula^jiot^have obtained' w a r nint -beforr^df^fftl'-Ul'i ~ cfrf en danfs'Body dissipated.
3. Searches and Seizures ^3.3(1)
exfgeiiO*»-iSyl'f&$#%':"t$* 'ffrnffftfrlze themselves, with ccnifM^iiI^)gj[ly-^n and a t e d procedure

3.

Because of cur disposition of petitioners' first
a l i g n m e n t of error, it is not necitsary lo dis-

cuss their other alignments.
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4. Arrest c^6S.5(4)
Warrantless entry into defendant's residence to effect arrest for driving while
under influence of intoxicants was unreasonable where, even though officers had
probable cause to believe that defendant
had been driving his car while under influence of intoxicants and to believe that defendant was in his apartment, no exigent
circumstances excusing failure to obtain
warrant were presented by officers' lack of
familiarity with procedure for obtaining
warrant and resultant delay that obtaining
warrant would have entailed. Const. Art.
1, § 9.
Steven L. Price, Hillsboro, argued the
cause and filed the brief for appellant.
Xim Y. "¥ie\V>, K^X. kY\>\ \^T>., ^ e m ,

argued the cause for respondent. With her
on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty.
Gen., and James E. Mountain, Jr., Sol.
Gen., Salem.
Before GILLETTE, P.J., JOSEPH, C.J.,
and YOUNG, J.
YOUNCLJudere.
ueiendant appeals nis conviction for
driving while under the influence of intoxicants (DUII). ORS 487.540. He argues
that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress evidence obtained as a
result of a warrantless entry into his resi*
dence. We agreear
Sunday, September 30, 19847 at approximately 2:30 p.m. Deputies Bass and Kayfes
received a radio dispatch to check for a
dr\it\k driver irv a browtv Puvto, Ikewse ^laXe
JTW 806. The deputies found the vehicle
off the road behind a guard rail. Kayfes
searched the unlocked car and through Motor Vehicle Division records determined
that defendant was the last known owner
of the vehicle and that he lived at a particular address on SW Franklin Street. Bass
was told by a service station attendant that
a drunken man had recently walkea into
the station, indicated that his car was off
the road and used the telephone to call a
taxi. The taxi company reported that a

driver had picked up a passenger at the
station at 2:33 p.m. and had dropped him
off at the Franklin Street address.
The deputies arrived at the Franklin
Street address at 2:58 p.m. They knocked
on the door and rang the door bell with no
response. The police dispatcher called defendant's phone number. The deputies
heard the phone ring, and then it stopped
ringing. The dispatcher verified that the
phone had been picked up and immediately
hung up. The deputies consulted with
their sergeant, who advised them to enter
the home to check on defendant's condition.
They entered the unlocked apartment and
announced their presence. They went upstairs to the bedroom and found defendant
in bed. Kayfes asked defendant if he was
all right and if he owned the Thrown Pinto.
Defendant responded yes to both questions. He was then advised of his Miranda rights and arrested. He took a
breath test which registered a .23 percent
blood alcohol content. He admitted that he
was drunk.
Defendant filed a_
press "all gyffif}^&n
n^TVp*nt ?.pfpTid"t oh*>t'nerl as a result of

thai tiir warratm
staw^sffiaaa
roaounablo jieayefags^
IV, XIV. The motion was denied.
In order to justify a warrantless entry of
a residence to effectuate an arrest, the
state must demonstrate bottor-^rttbabli

^^kmA^^g^^iyton

v.'Xtw York,

445 t^r^ffSToSO, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1382, 63
L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); State v. Rubert, 46
Or.App. 843, 612 P.2d 771 (1980). The officers had probable cause to believe that
defendant was driving his car while under
the influence of intoxicants and probable
cause to believe that defendant was in the
apartment. The critical issue is whether
the state carried its burden to prove that
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there were exigent circumstances excusing
the failure to obtain a w-arrant.
[1] "Exigent circumstances" involve an
emergency situation requiring swift action
to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property or to forestall the
imminent escape of a subject or the destruction of evidence. State v. Girard, 276
Or. 511, 514 n. 2, 555 P.2d 445 0976); State
v. Parras, 43 Or.App. 373, 376, 602 P.2d
1125 (1979), rev. den. 288 Or. 335 (1980).
The state argues that the officers' concern
for defendant's health and the need to test
for blood alcohol content before the alcohol
naturally dissipated justified proceeding
without a warrant. We agree with the

Defendant cites Welsh v. Wisconsin, —
U.S. — , 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732
(1984), for the proposition that, u^ffirAq

the facts in this case. The distinction is the
seriousness of the crime. The Supreme
Court explained:
"The State of Wisconsin has chosen to
classify the first offense for driving
while intoxicated as a non-criminal civil
forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible. * * * Given this expression of the state's ^ ^ ^ s i g J U ^ f *
simply because evi3?fjce o|T^jJ|Tttforipated vniie'^tne-^efe^^toim^n't.^w^gv
2100, 80 L.Ed.2d at 746 (citations omitted).
Oregon law treats drunk driving as a serious criminal offense. DUII is a Class A
misdemeanor. ORS 487.540(3). A first^offender may be imprisoned for up to one
year. ORS 161 615(1). The United States
!.

There is nothing in the record to suggest that
the trial court meant to take judicial notice of
the time necessary to obtain a warrant, but that

Supreme Court's holding in Welsh is inapposite.
[2] Because of the peculiar nature of
the DUII offense, defendant's personal
condition and, therefore, his person are evidence. In some circumstances, the need to
secure that evidence of the crime of DUII
—defendant's body—might justify a warrantless entry of a home, if the state
proves that the arresting officers could
not have obtained a warrant before the
alcohol in the suspect's body dissipated.
We turn to the evidence on that question.
[3] The evidence offered by the state in
this case consisted of the officers' testimony that obtaining a warrant would have
taken an entire day, because the officers
had no familiarity with the procedure. Police officers cannot create their own exigencies by failing to familiarize themselves
with constitutionally mandated procedures.
The court found that the state's evidence
as to exigency was in 'somewhat of a
peculiar mode," because the testifying officer did not really know how long it would
take to get a warrant. The court then
made the following factual findings:
"I do have some experience in those
sorts of situations and so I kind of in
effect know from my own experience as
opposed to the evidence that it wouldn't
take a day but it would take two to three
hours and then the location of a judge
and the securing of the warrant would
take—some of that can go on during the
same time but you have to deliver the
papers, he has to sign them, etc. So
you're talking something in the area of
three to four hours, assuming one of the
judges was available at that time * * *
and you'd be in the area of six or seven
hours from the time of arriving to the
arrest * * * and I know that an ,08 will
dissipate from a person's body in something like four hours * * *."
The court's factual findings are not supported by any evidence in the record.1 We
also note that the court did not consider the
would not have been a proper subject for judicial notice in any event. Scv OEC 201(b).

iAYNES v. \YFA ERYLVSTBET* CO.

Or.

567

CM. as 706 P.2^ = 67 (Or.App. 1985)

l5»H^tl«^

133.545(4); 133.555(3), a procedure which i£
available when a personal application
would interfere with the ability of the police to conduct a timely search. State VJordan, 73 Or.App. 84, 88 n. 2, 697 P.2d
1004 (1985).
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dispute between claimant and self-insured
employer over appropriate amount of payment of doctor's fee for services in connection with an accepted claim. The Court of
Appeals, Young, J., held that Board lacked
jurisdiction, since under statute, a dispute
concerning amount of fee to which medical
service provider is entitled for providing
medical services to compensibly injured
workers is excluded from jurisdiction of
Hearings D: Ision and Board.
Affirmed.

_rartS47,
612 P.2d 771.
\A\ The ^tate failed to c?oc\:\ \te busdett
to prove exigency. We,h^il^kU^.^UlxX
..JStft*! . _ „ _ _
,. ._.._„_,...
ti
.., fcrftrTrte of ml
Reversed and remanded for a new trialCo | < t f »ai<BlRSYSUMj

75 Or.App. 262

In the Matter of the Compensation of
Charles S. Haynes, Claimant.
Charles S. HAYNES, Petitioner,
v.
WEYERHAEUSER CO., Respondent.
81-09765; CA A33306.
Court of Appeals of Oregon.
Argued and Submitted March 1, 1985.
Decided Sept. 18, 1985.
Reconsideration Denied Nov. 1, 1985.
Review Denied Nov. 26, 1985.
Claimant petitioned for review of decision of Workers' Compensation Bakrd in
2. The stale also argues thai the warrantless entry was justified, because defendant had "little
subjective expectation of privacy in his hom£
and that defendant "consented" to the entry by

Workers' Com pen sal ion C--1086
Pursuant to ORS 656.704(3), a dispute
concerning amount of fee to which medical
service provider is entitled for providing
medical services to compensibly injured
workers is excluded from jurisdiction of
Hearings Division. Therefore, the Workers' Compensation Board lacked jurisdiction to review dispute between claimant
and self-insured employer over appropriate
amount of payment of doctor's fee for services in connection with an accepted claim.
ORS 656 2S3(1).

James L. Edmunson, Eugene, argued the
cause for petitioner. With him on brief
were Evohl F. Ma'agon, and Malagon &
Associates, Eugene.
J.P. Graff, Portland, argued the cause
for respondent. With him on brief were
Schwabe, Williamson, Wyatt, Moore & Roberts, Portland.
Before GILLETTE, P.J., and
HOOMISSEN and YOUNG, JJ.

VAN

YOUNG, Judge.
The issue in this workers' compensation
case is whether, in light of the provisions
of ORS 656.283(1), the Workers' Compensation Board has jurisdiction to review a disnot telling the officers to leave when they entered his bedroom. The arguments are without
merit.
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otherwise provided in this act and except
that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this act may not be disclaimed
by agreement but the parties may be
[sic] agreement determine the standards
by which the performance of such obligations is to be measured of [sic] such
standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
14. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b); supra notes 2-3.
15. Cf. Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. First Security
Corp., 9 Utah 2d 215, 218, 341 P.2d 944, 946 (1959)
(bank's agreement with insured caused latter to
assume bank would fulfill its obligations thereunder).
16.756 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1985).
17. Id. at 668.
18. Although the court in W.B. Farms elsewhere
indicated that drawee banks are generally not liable
to payees on checks, at least one exception was
noted in that case, and given our holding concerning
a bank's duty to act in good faith and exercise
ordinary care in all their dealings, another exception
is recognized.
19. See generally Livingston Indus., Inc. v. Walker
Bank & Trust Co., 565 P.2d 1117, 1118 (Utah
1977); Walker Bank & Trust Co., 9 Utah 2d at 21718, 341 P.2d at 945-46. Cf. Wasatch Bank v.
Surety Ins. Co. of Cal., 703 P.2d 298, 300 (Utah
1985) ("Whether a third party is a beneficiary of a
contract is determined by the intent of the parties to
the contract as evidenced by the contract itself and
the surrounding facts and circumstances. * (Footnote
omitted.)).
20. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
21. See Phillips Home Furnishings, Inc., 231 Pa.
Super, at 183-84, 331 A.2d at 844-45.
22. See id. at 184,332 A.2d at 844-45.
23. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 9 Utah 2d at 218,
341P.2dat946.
24. See supra notes 5-13 and accompanying text; see
also Utah Code Ann. 70A-1-203 (1980)
("Every contract or duty within this act imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.").
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (Concurring in the
Result)
I agree that this case should be remanded to the
trial court because there were adequate allegations in
the complaints to warrant further proceedings, under
either tort or contract rubric, that could lead to the
recovery of the damages spelled out in section 70A4-103 of the Commercial Code. See Utah Code
Ann. §70A-4-103 (1981); U.C.C. §4-103
(1978). However, I would make it clear that the
question of whether the bank failed to act in good
faith is quite a different issue than whether it failed
to exercise ordinary care.
Section 70A-4-103 governs the remedies available in this case as a result of either a failure to
exercise ordinary care or actions taken in bad faith.
Section 70A-4103(5) permits the collection of consequential (but not punitive) damages when "bad
faith" is shown, but when nothing more is proven
than a "failure to exercise ordinary care," one may
recover only "the amount of the item reduced by an
amount which could not have been realized by the
use of ordinary care.*1 Utah Code Ann. §70A-4-
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103(5) (1981). The concepts of "good faith" and its
opposite, "bad faith," as well as that of "ordinary
care/ should not be casually smeared together under
the rubric of "good faith and ordinary care," as the
majority appears to do at places in its opinion. This
sort of casual use of terminology invites conceptual
misunderstandings by the Bar, trial courts, and
juries. In articulating the law, we should do so with
some analytical precision. That is one of our primary
obligations as an appellate court. See Johnson v.
Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 785 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman,
J., concurring in part, joined by Hall, C.J., Howe,
A.C.J., and Stewart, J.).
1. Because the damages'specified in section 70A-4103(5) are specially tailored for UCC violations and
are more limited than what might be available at
common law, the result of this statutory tailoring of
damages is to make the contract or tort designation
of the cause of action rather academic. Cf. Beck v.
Farmers* Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 801-02 (Utah
1985) (comparing range of damages available in tort
and contract).
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IN T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
OF T H E STATE OF U T A H
STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Steven Ray JAMES,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 870306
FILED: January 6, 1989
FIRST DISTRICT
Honorable VeNoy Chxistoffersen
ATTORNEYS:
Robert W. Gutke, Nathan D. Hult, Logan,
for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam, Sandra L. Sjogren, Salt
Lake City, for Appellee
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice:
On petition of defendant Steven Ray James, which
he filed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-3526(2)(c) (1982, Supp. 1988), we granted this interlocutory appeal from certain pretrial orders in the
instant case in which defendant is charged with first
degree murder. He claims two errors: (1) that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion
for a change of venue; and (2) that his right to a fair
trial will be jeopardized by the use of a prior conviction as an aggravating circumstance to be proved in
the guilt phase of his trial.
tin August 26, 1986, defendant reported that his
infant son, Steven Roy James, was missing from a
parked car in which he had left him in a store's
parking lot in Logan, Utah. Extensive news media
coverage began immediately. Some of this news
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coverage was in connection with information disseminated by the Logan Police Department. Other
coverage was in connection with efforts to find the
missing child, spearheaded by a local volunteer
committee organized for that purpose. Additional
coverage was of direct contacts by reporters with the
parents of the infant.
On October 11, 1986, the remains of an infant,
later identified as Steven Roy James, were found in
Cache County, submerged in an area known as the
Benson Marina, by a group of duck hunters. The
remains had begun to decompose, and identification
was made through forensic evidence concerning the
infant's hair, footprints and handprints, and identification of the clothing and blanket in which the
body was wrapped as being similar to clothing and a
blanket belonging to the baby. The actual cause of
death was undetermined but listed as a homicide by
the state medical examiner. There was no objective
evidence, however, as to the cause of death.
Defendant was charged with first degree murder, a
capital offense, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-5202(l)(h) (1978, Supp. 1988). The charge alleged that
he intentionally or knowingly caused the death of
Steven Roy James and alleged as an aggravating
circumstance that defendant had previously been
convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of
violence to a person. Discovery disclosed that defendant was convicted in 1973 in the state of California
of the crime of false imprisonment, which the prosecution argues is a felony involving the use or threat
of violence to a person. He allegedly pleaded guilty
to false imprisonment pursuant to a plea negotiation
in which a charge of kidnapping was dismissed.

CHANGE OF VENUE
Defendant moved for but was denied a change of
venue. He argues that the extensive pretrial publicity
and the unique circumstances of widespread community involvement in Cache County, a relatively small
and homogeneous geographical area, to fmd the
missing child make it extremely difficult for him to
obtain a fair trial. Thus, he contends the denial of
his motion was an abuse of discretion. The constitutions of Utah and of the United States both guarantee a defendant the right of trial by an impartial
jury. Utah Const, art. I, §12; U.S. Const, amend.
VI. This right has been implemented by Utah Code
Ann. §77-35-29(e)(i) and (ii) (1982, Supp. 1988),
which provides:
(i) If the prosecution or a defendant in
a criminal action believes that a fair and
impartial trial cannot be had in the jurisdiction where the action is pending,
either may, by motion, supported by an
affidavit setting forth the facts, ask to
have the trial of the case transferred to
another jurisdiction.
(ii) If the court is satisfied that the
representations made in the affidavit are
true and justify transfer of the case, the
court shall enter an order for the
removal of the case to the court of
another jurisdiction free from the objection and all records pertaining to {he
case shall be transferred forthwith to the
court in the other county. If the court is
not satisfied that the representations so
made justify transfer of the case, the
court shall either enter an order denying
the transfer or order a formai hearing in
UTAH
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court to resolve the matter and receive
further evidence with respect to the
alleged prejudice.
See Utah R. Crim. P. 29(e)®, (ii).
Although the statute speaks in terms of the trial
court's being "satisfied" that the representations
made in the affidavit are true and justify transfer of
the case, this Court has apparently never defined the
term "satisfied." We note that this term has been
employed in our change of venue statute since at
least 1888. See 2 Comp. Laws of Utah §4992 (1888).
In the long line of cases which have come to this
Court beginning with State v. Carrington, 15 Utah
480, 50 P. 526 (1897), we have held that it lies within
the sound discretion of the trial court to determine if
a change of venue should be granted on the ground
that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the
county in which the offense has been committed, and
this Court will not disturb that decision unless an
abuse of discretion is shown. We have in every case
which has come to this Court found no abuse of
discretion in the denial of a change of venue by the
trial court. Only in State v. BeBec, 110 Utah 484,
491, 175 P.2d 478, 481 (1946), did we go so far as to
say that "it certainly would not have been error for
the court to have granted a change of venue and we
are of the opinion that it would have been better if
the trial court had granted the change under the circumstances ...." The circumstances of that case
which prompted that strong statement from this
Court were
inflammatory newspaper comments;
suggestive remarks of a church official
quoted in the paper; the gathering of an
armed mob; a comparatively small
community, no doubt closely knit by
church affiliations; a deceased well
known to the community, popular, and
having many friends and relatives throughout the county; and an obviously
eccentric old man as an accused whose
penchant for rhetorical showmanship
repulses what little tolerance might otherwise have been accorded him.
BcBcc, 110 Utah at 491, 175 P.2d at 481-82. In
every other case decided by this Court on this
subject, we have simply held that the denial of a
change of venue was not an abuse of discretion and
that the showing made by the defendant in support
of his motion was inadequate. But we have never
defined or attempted to indicate other than our
expression in State v. BeBcc, quoted above, what
would be an adequate showing. Even in that case,
however, we did not hold that the denial was an
abuse of discretion, although we did state that "it
would have been better" if the change of venue had
been granted.
Although the term "satisfied" is often used in the
law to mean something akin to a conviction or belief
beyond a reasonable doubt, in the context of change
of venue, the term should not be given that meaning.
In Stare v. BeBee, in dictum we indicated that
"where there is a probability" that pretrial publicity
and prejudice will be given undue consideration or
that bias will creep in because of these factors, it
would be well for the trial judge to remove the trial
to a place far enough away where such influence
would be a negligible factor if present at all. Later,
in State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 88-89 (Utah 1982),
we stated that the affidavit of defense counsel and a
newspaper article regarding the victim's father fell
JCE REPORTS
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far short of demonstrating that there was such a
tainted community attitude that a fair and impartial
trial was "not likely." In an attempt to more definitely define the standard to be followed by the trial
judge in considering a motion for a change of venue,
we conclude that the judge should grant the motion
whenever he or she finds a reasonable likelihood that
a fair trial cannot be had unless the motion is
granted. This is the rule fashioned by the Supreme
Court of California in Maine v. Superior Court, 68
Cal. 2d 375, 438 P.2d 372, 66 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1968),
taking its cue from language used in Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,363 (1966). In a later case, Frazier
v. Superior Court of Santa Cruz County, 5
Cal. 3d 287, 486 P.2d 694, 95 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1971),
the California court explained that a reasonable likelihood of prejudice does not mean that the prejudice
must be more probable than not. In summary, although section 77-35-29(e)(ii) employs language to
the effect that the trial court should be "satisfied"
that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the
jurisdiction where the action is pending, the burden
on the defendant should be understood to be that he
must raise a "reasonable likelihood" that such a trial
cannot be afforded him.
We now examine the record in an attempt to
isolate the factors which have been considered criteria of the potential for prejudice from pretrial
publicity. Factors to be considered include (1) the
standing of the victim and the accused in the community; (2) the size of the community; (3) the nature
and gravity of the offense; and (4) the nature and
extent of publicity. Martinez v. Superior Court of
Placer County, 29 Cal. 3d 574, 629 P.2d 502, 174
Cal. Rptr. 701 (1981). We will discuss the impact of
these factors in the instant case, bearing in mind that
we take the totality of the circumstances into
account. State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1350 (Utah
1977), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 882 (1978).

Standing of Accused and Victim in
Community
Defendant and the victim's mother had lived together in Logan for only two weeks prior to the
infant's disappearance. They were not married.
Defendant has relatively long hair and at an earlier
time wore a stud in one ear. At his preliminary
hearing, there was testimony that he had been using
drugs shortly before the child disappeared. All of this
tends to depict him as being different from most
residents in Cache County. The victim was three
months old at the time of his disappearance.

Size of the Community
Logan, where the child lived at the time of his disappearance, is the county seat of Cache County and in
1986 had an estimated population of 28,880. Cache
County has an estimated population of 69,200.
"(Tine smaller the community, the more likely
there will be a need for a change of venue in any
event when a heinous crime is committed." Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, All U.S. 539, 599-600 n.22
(1976) (Brcnnan, J., concurring in the judgment). A
populous metropolitan community will decrease the
need for a change of venue. People v. Harris, 28
Cal. 3d 935, 623 P.2d 240, 171 Cal. Rptr. 679, cert,
denied, 454 U.S. 882 (1981); People v. Manson, 61
Cal. App. 3d 102, 190, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265, 318
(1976), cert, denied, 430 U.S. 986 (1977) (refusal to
move trial from Los Angeles area). In a small town,
a major crime is likely to be embedded in the public
consciousness with greater effect and for a longer
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time than it would be in a large, metropolitan area. Martinez v. Superior Court of Placer County.
In the instant case, not only are we concerned with
a small city and a small county, but during the
month and one-half that the child was missing,
there was a widespread community effort to help
locate the missing child. The community's efforts
were organized and directed by the wife of the
bishop of a local ward of the city's predominant
church. The ward's church building was used as the
center for the volunteer activity. In addition to eightysix adult volunteers, offers of assistance came from
three Girl Scout groups, a high school journalism
class, the local relief societies of the predominant
church, an Assembly of God church, and various
local businesses. An appeal was made to school children of the community for envelopes and stamps for
the purpose of sending out flyers. Thousands of
flyers, posters, and envelopes were printed. The
paper and the printing labor were donated. Sixteen
thousand flyers were mailed out by Medmaster.
Preparations were made for a nationwide effort to
find the baby. Phones were donated, and pictures
were printed by a grocery chain on grocery bags and
distributed to 600 stores. A fast food restaurant
printed thousands of tray place mats with the
infant's picture. Besides the large contributions in
material, labor, and postage, cash contributions
exceeded $1,700. Much of that money was collected
through small donations dropped into bottles which
had been placed in grocery stores. One business in
Logan loaned typewriters to the volunteers. Another
business sent flyers out to all their employees. Photographic materials and labor were donated in preparing photos of the missing child. Other businesses
donated office supplies to assist the volunteers. A
public utility supplying natural gas in an area spreading over three states, including Cache County,
printed 500,000 copies of the story of the child's
disappearance and mailed them with its monthly
statements. Several fast food businesses provided
lunches for the volunteers.
The chairwoman of the volunteer committee testified that most of the volunteers "had some degree of
emotional involvement in what they were doing" and,
after the child's body was found and defendant had
been charged with the killing, that she heard a news
report that some of the volunteers "felt they had
been a bit gullible." She denied that any volunteer
had made that comment to her, but admitted that
many people had expressed opinions to her concerning defendant's guilt or innocence. She testified,
however, that she personally was content to presume
him innocent until he had been proved guilty.

Nature and Gravity of the Offense
The body of the three-month-old infant was
found submerged in a river and weighted down with
rocks. Defendant is charged with the intentional
killing of his child, first degree murder, a capital
offense which could be punishable by death.

Nature and Extent of Publicity
The disappearance of the child, the search effort,
and the discovery of the child's body a month and
one-half later generated extensive media coverage.
Some of it was in connection with information disseminated by the Logan Police Department. Other
coverage was in connection with efforts to find the
missing child, spearheaded by the volunteer committee. Additional news stories came from direct contact* oy reporters with the parents of the infant. The
three television stations in Salt Lake City which can
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be viewed in Cache County covered the events as
follows: Television station KUTV, channel 2, carried
eighty-four news items on thirty-four different
days; KTVX, channel A carried thirty-six news
items on twenty-five different days; KSL, channel
5, carried thirty-eight news items on twenty-five
different days.
Newspaper coverage included forty-five news
articles on forty-two different days in The Herald
Journal, Logan's daily newspaper. The Cache
Citizen, a Cache Valley weekly newspaper, published
five feature articles. Moreover, two local radio stations carried numerous accounts of the events.
Not only was the media coverage extensive, some
of it also carried implications and innuendos of defendant's complicity in the child's disappearance.
References were made to defendant's becoming
"uncooperative," that he "was always the key
suspect," and that he "persistently denied involvement." Contrast was drawn between his tears and the
"real ones" belonging to one of the volunteers. The
statement was made that he "acted every inch the
grieving father." It was further reported that "he
even threatened to kill the detective who cracked the
case." Moreover, some of the information disseminated by the police was equally troublesome, viz., that
defendant had become uncooperative, that police
wanted answers, that details related him to a California abduction at knifepoint and a police investigation of a California child abuse case where an
infant sustained severe injuries, that the child's
mother had passed a polygraph but that defendant
twice refused to take one, that defendant was hostile
to police, and that he was always the key suspect.

Analysis and Conclusion
The evidence on the foregoing four factors weighs in
favor of granting a change of venue. Defendant,
being a newcomer to Logan and having a lifestyle
quite different from most of its residents, suffers
from a lack of standing in the community. The
victim was a helpless, innocent baby. Logan and
Cache County are small, which weighs against defendant. Defendant stands charged with first degree
murder, the only criminal offense in Utah which may
be punishable by death. Because of the lapse of a
month and one-half between the time the child
disappeared and the time his body was found submerged in a river, extensive news coverage was made
of the disappearance, the search efforts, and the
discovery of the body. Defendant was always a
suspect because of his past record, and this fact was
mentioned with others which cast suspicion upon him
from the very start.
While all of these facts weigh in favor of changing
venue, we believe that there is in this case another
factor which clinches our belief that a reasonable
likelihood exists that defendant cannot receive a fair
and impartial trial in Cache County. Unlike any case
which has come before this Court where it has been
contended that a change of venue should have been
granted, in the instant case there was a widespread
community effort to locate the missing child. This
effort touched many adults, schoolchildren, and
businesses. They responded with money, material,
and countless hours of labor. This community involvement brought many people much closer to this
alleged crime than ordinarily occurs. One television
news story reported that the events had "touched the
community at its very core"; another news release
quoted a Logan resident as saying, "We're all talcing
this very personally. It's as though someone lias
UTAH
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violated our homes ..- our families." In State v.
Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981), State v. Pierre, 572
P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 882
(1978), State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988),
and State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988), all
recent capital murder cases in which we held that the
trial court had not abused its discretion in denying
motions for change of venue even though the crime
in each case was heinous and aroused many of the
populace, there was no community involvement. We
believe this involvement gives the instant case a very
different dimension and accentuates the difficulty in
seating a jury which has not been touched in some
way, either directly or through family or friends,
with this crime, which played a prominent part in the
lives of Cache County residents for a month and onehalf.
The trial judge, in denying the motion for a
change of venue, commented that "the easiest thing"
for him to do would be to grant the motion, but that
even though information prejudicial to defendant
had been disseminated through the media, he did not
find that its impact had been so great that he could
not find twelve jurors in Cache County who could
try the case without bias or prejudice against defendant. He cited the testimony of the chairwoman of
the volunteers, who stated that although she had
been heavily involved in the search for the child, she
had no opinion as to defendant's guilt or innocence
and would presume him to be innocent until proved
guilty. We do not doubt the sincerity of the conclusion of the trial judge, nor do we question the integrity of the chairwoman's testimony. Jurors are
commonly seated to hear felony trials after they have
stated that despite hearing prejudicial information
about the defendant and perhaps even having formulated some opinion as to guilt, they would be able
to set aside any preconceived notions and decide the
case on the evidence presented at trial. This Court
has upheld on appeal attacks against many jury verdicts rendered under such circumstances. See State v.
Lafferty and cases cited therein. We believe,
however, that the instant case presents a set of circumstances not usually found in criminal cases. Here,
the impact of the alleged crime reached deeply into
the community. Not only were residents exposed to
media information on almost a daily basis, but also
many adults and children assisted in one way or
another in the month and one-half search effort.
Although we do not doubt that twelve persons could
be found who could honestly promise to set aside
any prejudicial information which they had heard
and any preconceived notions which they had
formed, there are limits to what should reasonably be
asked and expected of prospective jurors who have
been exposed to the events surrounding the alleged
crime. See State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473 (Utah 1987),
where we reversed the trial court's denial of a challenge for cause made by the defendant against two
jurors who were closely associated with members of
the victim's family, but who, when pressed, stated
that they would base their decision on the evidence
and follow the law as instructed upon.
Defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial need
not be exposed to the risks which would attend the
calling of the jury from Cache County. This is a
capital case. Not only will a jury be required to determine the guilt or innocence of defendant, but if
guilt is found, the jury will probably be urged by the
prosecution to impose the death penalty. In deciding
whether to impose the death penalty, the jury must
weigh aggravating circumstances against mitigating
*CE REPORTS

circumstances. This is the most momentous judgment
a jury can be asked to make. The judgment should
be made in an atmosphere as free from any taint of
bias or prejudice as is reasonably possible. Because
of the unique circumstances of this case, it would not
be fair or wise to either defendant or the residents of
Cache County to require a Cache County jury to
make that decision.
Unlike any of the other cases coming before this
Court where the trial court has denied a motion for a
change of venue, this case has not yet been tried.
This circumstance affords us the opportunity to
review the denial before any error committed would
be prejudicial to defendant. We are in accord with a
statement made by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363, 86
S. Q . 1507, 1522, 16 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1966), that
"reversals are but palliatives" and that "the cure lies
in those remedial measures that will prevent the
prejudice at its inception/ Later, the California
court in Martinez v. Superior Court of Placer
County expressed the same sentiment:
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rather than because he has been proved guilty of
capital homicide.
In other contexts, the legislature has recognized the
prejudicial impact of presenting prior convictions of
a defendant before a jury and has taken necessary
precautions to insure that such prejudice based upon
a defendant's "status" as a previously convicted
felon will not taint a jury's fact-finding task. Our
habitual criminal statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-81002(2)(3) (1978) provides:

(2) If the defendant is bound over to
the district court for trial, the county
attorney shall in the information or
complaint set forth the felony committed
within the state of Utah and the two or
more previous felony convictions relied
upon for the charge of being-a habitual
criminal. If a jury is impaneled, it shall
not be told of the previous felony convictions or charge of being a habitual
criminal. The trial on the felony committed within the state of Utah shall
proceed as in other cases.
Neither an accused whose life hangs in
(3) If the court or jury finds the defethe balance nor the authorities charged
ndant guilty of the felony charged, then
with enforcing and administering the law
the defendant shall be tried immediately
should be required to face the possibility
by the same judge and jury, if a jury was
of a second trial when, as here, we face
impaneled, on the charge of being a
acute dangers to an impartial trial and
habitual criminal, unless the defendant
when we can avoid them by the simple
has entered or enters a plea of guilty to
expedience of a change of venue.
the charge of being a habitual criminal.
Martinez, 629 P.2d at 508,174 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
Thus, the court is prohibited from reading a habIn summary, the trial court abused its discretion in
itual criminal charge to a jury before guilt on the
denying the motion for a change of venue. Judicial
substantive offense is determined. Only if a verdict
economy will be served by now reversing the order
denying the motion and granting the motion. The of guilty is returned can the jury, in a bifurcated
proceeding, be presented evidence of past convicttrial can then go forward in another county where a
ions. See State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah
jury can be selected free from any taint of prejudice,
1985), where we held it was an abuse of discretion
and if a jury should convict defendant, its verdict
for a trial court to deny a timely filed motion by a
would not be vulnerable to attack for community
criminal defendant to separately try him on burglary
bias and hostility. This Court will then be spared the
and theft charges from a charge that he unlawfully
difficulty it encountered in State v. BeBcc, where we
possessed a firearm while he was a prison inmate
were of the opinion that "it would have been better if
housed in a halfway house. Utah Code Ann. §76the trial court had granted the change under the cir10-503(2) (1978, Supp. 1988). The basis of our
cumstances of this case" but struggled to affirm the
decision was to avoid any tendency on the part of the
conviction in spite of that opinion.
fact finder to convict him of burglary and theft
ADMISSION OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR
because of the prior crime for which he was incarcCRIMINAL RECORD
erated. We affirm that evidence of prior crimes is
generally presumed prejudicial and that "absent a
Defendant is charged with murder in the first degree,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202(1 )(h) reason for the admission of the evidence other than
to show criminal disposition, the evidence is excl(1978, Supp. 1988). That section provides:
uded. " Saunders, 699 P.2d at 741.
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder
In order to avoid prejudice to the defendant in the
in the first degree if the actor intentioninstant case while the jury is deciding his guilt of the
ally or knowingly causes the death of
offense charged, we exercise our inherent supervisory
another under any of the following cirpower over trial courts and adopt the bifurcated
cumstances:
approach advanced in State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,
498 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the
(h) The actor was previously convicted
result), and apply it to section 76-5-202(1 )(h). The
of first or second degree murder or of a
jury is not initially to be presented with mention or
felony involving the use or threat of violence to
evidence of defendant's prior conviction. If the jury
a person.
finds him guilty of an intentional and knowing
(Emphasis added.) It is alleged that he intentionally
killing, it may then be instructed on the prior convior knowingly caused the death of his son and that he
ction if the trial court determines that it qualifies
had been previously convicted of a felony involving
under^section 76-5-202(1 )(h). The jury should then
the use or threat of violence to a person. Defendant
return to deliberate the existence or nonexistence of
complains that reading to a jury that he allegedly had
the prior conviction, which will, in turn, determine
been earlier convicted of a felony as part of the
whether the homicide is first or second degree
charging information before presentation of any
murder. "It is especially appropriate that we exercise
evidence will be prejudicial because of the tendency
that supervisory power to require certain procedures
of the jury to convict because he is a "bad person" , when fundamental values are threatened by other
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

Larson v. SYS<CO
Corporation
\dv. Rep.

CODE*CO
Provo, Utah

Q

99 Utah J

modes of proceeding." Bishop, 753 P.2d at 499.
Justice Zimmerman wrote:

HOWE, Associate Chief Justice:

The legitimate interests of the state and
the accused can easily be accommodated
through a bifurcated procedure. When
the underlying crime is charged, and
enhancing circumstances involving other
crimes or bad acts factually related to the
underlying criminal episode are also
charged for the purpose of increasing the
severity of the punishment for the underlying crime, the trial court must divide
the trial into separate segments. First,
evidence regarding the underlying crime
should be admitted, and the jury should
be asked to determine guilt or innocence
based on that evidence alone. Second, if
a guilty verdict is returned on the underlying charge, then evidence regarding
the enhancing circumstances should be
heard by the same jury for the purpose
of determining whether those circumstances have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Bishop, 753 P.2d at 498.
We reverse the order denying defendant's motion
for a change of venue and grant the same. The trial
court is directed to remove the case to another
county "free from the objection" in accordance with
section 77-35-29(e)(ii). There, the trial of defendant shall proceed in accordance with this opinion.

Plaintiff Kit C. Larson appeals from a summary
judgment granted in favor* of his former employer,
SYSCO Corporation, and his supervisors, defendants
Robert Jenson and Robert Wagner, in a suit arising
out of Larson's termination of employment.
Larson was employed by SYSCO as a commissioned salesman from March 1981 through April 1984.
He worked under a written employment agreement
which provided that his employment could be terminated by SYSCO at any time upon notice. Larson
was terminated by his immediate supervisor, Wagner,
without explanation except for the statement that he
was to be "let go." SYSCO paid Larson all commissions due him plus severance pay for a two-week
period, representing approximately 30 percent per
week more than that which he had earned as commissions immediately prior to his termination.
SYSCO submitted to the Utah Department of Employment Security the required "blue slip," which
indicated that Larson's employment had been terminated for "poor performance."
Larson subsequently filed this suit, alleging breach
of contract, defamation, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from the termination. After discovery was conducted, SYSCO moved
for summary judgment on all of Larson's claims.
The motion was granted. Larson brings this appeal,
assailing the grant of summary judgment and the
denial of his motion to amend his complaint.

WE CONCUR:
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice
Christine M. Durham, Justice
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice

I.
Larson contends that there are numerous issues of
disputed fact which should have precluded the grant
of summary judgment. First, he argues that the
manner of his termination did not comply with the
provision of the written employment contract governing notice to be afforded him upon termination. In
this respect, the agreement provides:
E m p l o y e e ' s employment with the
Company may be terminated at any time
by the Company or by Employee upon
proper written notice. Proper notice is
related to the length of employment as
follows: ... over one (1) year employment, two weeks' notice.
Larson worked for SYSCO for more than three years
and under the contract was entitled to two weeks'
written notice. It is undisputed that after the employment contract had been executed, SYSCO revised its
policy concerning employee termination, and instead
of giving the employee the advance notice required
by the contract, it terminated the employee without
notice but provided him with severance pay for a
period of time equal to the advance-notice time
specified in the contract. This was done in response
to SYSCO's experience that sales performance typically declined after receiving written notice of termination. We find no violation of the contract by this
policy. Larson was entitled to two weeks' advance
notice. He received pay for two weeks but was relieved of the obligation to render any services during
that time. This left him free to seek other employment while enjoying full pay without any employment responsibility.
Larson contends that the legality of his termination
should be determined according to Idaho law inasmuch as the written agreement provided that *[i]n
the event of any dispute arising under this agreement,
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: STATE OF UTAH,
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I)

Plaintiff.
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Defendant.
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE COUNTY OF RICH, STATE OF UTAH:
Proof by affidavit was made before me this day by
at there is probable cause for issuance of a search warrant.
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to make immediate search, (in the daytime) (

**y**ttttrr**t-**'

girt), of the person of

the vehicles described as \°l 1<£

fonh

Vc/ C,

L>fqb

/'Ufa

bjoC
the premises described as "7 o ~y ^,^^^

r the following property: ,;
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/

I

-

i

, J

/

si O

i

*

t < -IL

/

If you find any of the property described above, or any purt thereof, bring it before
» immediately at his court and make return within 10 days, as required by Utah Code Ann.
action 77-23-1 et seq.
Youfcaos5p)(arenot) authorized to execute this search warrant without giving prior
itice of you authority and purpose.
ite signed / O - / / - ^

Time signed

/$.'*/?

MagUtr

*k O

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff.
PROPERTY RECEIPT, INVENTORY, ANDltSaSSM

Vi.

xV'J £ IK*

Case No.

Defendant,
RECEIPT

I, the officer undersigned, acknowledge receiving the property described
below, on the date, and time shown, from:
Pe rson
Place 7 ^ 7

Da te

Ci'Sfp

fed

lO'lH-^

Time

/ > , ' / /

Officer serving Searc^r Warrant"
INVENTORY

Property s e i z e d : <ff QoA'n^^

nC

ft'frr,~<hf<r

VQfxv*

<,tr<>

^iKcg.

THE STATE OF UTAH.
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'

COURT, STATE OF UTAH
RICH COUNTY
n p0R

^

WARRANT

\
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\

Defendant.

)

Case No.

AFFIDAVIT
RICH COUNTY

)
)
STATE OF UTAH )

ss

Affiant, being first duly sworn, states on oath that:
1 OFFICER. I am a peace officer in the State of Utah employed for J Z ^
y e a r

? PRR0PCERTYC° P r o p e r t y or evidence for which a search warrant
sought is described as follows:^ ^ ^
^ ^
Bc^t
Ml/Ujqo^t^
toI'UUO„•&£},-

..:. Lee/

CQnk £sf/,0f

"

I
£<«»&

£*fh/

3. LOCATION. I have probable cause * * " ™ * ^ ^ & $ ^ M
1s
located
on the ^person
i P ^ that
J J ^the location
^ n cou.a
could be found by
as: (the description
must ^vehicle
Be so specific
one not knowing where i t i s ) ^ ^ ^ ^
^ f{9W< c*6>* " * * « /o3
/rJ

u

tM

^

M

X 3 ? « X i <* •' ^ "y - > " ~r **> '•
Akv « * < * Hi/t

QJo^ot'h

i*fi*$

»M

foist

f/J<L

AaAKT

aavit xor iearcn warrant, page d
4. STATUTORY GROUNDS. I have probable cause to believe this property or
evidence (check those that apply and fill in blank with name of crime)
_^__was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed
Has been used or is possessed for the purpose of being used to commit
or conceal the commission of the offense of
5. ATTACHMENTS. The following attachments are incorporated in this affidavit
as though set forth herein: (list written informants' statements, documentary
evidence and other exhibits)
Exhibit 1
Exhibit 2
Exhibit 3
Exhibit 4
Exhibit 5
6. NIGHT SEARCH. I have reasonable cause to believe a search is necessary in
the night as follows: (state why property may be concealed, damaged, altered
or other good reason).

™ n ^ ? + 5 *lu * ^ ^ the fo1 lowing evidence which allows the search to be
conducted without notice of authority and purpose: (state wny the object of
S L S w . J ^ ! quickly destroyed, disposed of or secreted or why physical
harm may result to a person if notice is given)

1nfoJEs?US

INF0RMANTS

-

The

Allowing are designations of anonymous

I ^ i r J ^ 1 1 * 1 ^ 1 s w i t n n e l d because (state why the informant would be endangered
or his usefulness destroyed if name was stated)

E
ve t h e info
thesJ
ri«il:iT Y '/(check
I b ? 1 !u
™ants named herein to be reliable for
tnese reasons:
those that apply)

the following informants made statements against their penal interest:

6
C1 i2en i n f o
this» mitter?
S l ? l lstate
2 t i n !which
h ! S nones
? a r eare
'J
™ e r spersonalis
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matter. (iai$o
known to you

.the following informants are peace officers with the departments noted:

re
use
t e t h e narae o f
inforia^-and 2JlTM?™bISlH«?h*
I*! 1 * 516 bore c aprevious
< s t a reliable
each
tacts corroborating his statement
statements)
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n't for Search Warrant, page 5
owing
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Wa rrant:
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W i f i c facts of
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Affidavit for Search Warrant, page 6.
DATE SIGNED:

TIME SIGNED:

Affiant
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

day of

Magistrate
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NAME (lent)

aTATF. OF UTAH
COUNTY OF RICH

ADDMSS

CITY OF
DEFENDANT IS HEREBY
ENNOTiaTOAPFUlBEKMU

.•

&"»>
/ ^ ^

•.

(C.ty)

Driver Lk*m« N A .
Vehido Color

(M,ddl«)

F
, .

Slot*

-

Vehicle Year

(State)

'

<^Z
Venule Moke

]

DOB

*

ZIP

J ^ ^^ / *

Stat*

Vehicle License No.

'Expires

Accident

Typ*

Direction

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING: &jf
Q^TAHCODf
DCOUNTYCODE
D CITY CODE. NO:*

HH>AT_

ONTr*_L

_OAYOf_

10 • »

%',??*.
-y

? ^

MILITARY TIME.

>RB£F0RETHE2AJDAY0r,
LOCATION,

HE HOUR Or

« #./£' ?TS

COURT.

FOR COURT USE ONLY
Of CONVICTlON/FOIfMTJiei;

SUSPENDED-

LEA/FINDING

Spooling.

MPH
.Zone OVER

_MPH in o .

SEVERITY

iHy

Q Minimum

t Guilty

D Intermediate

4eHed toil

D Maximum

STOP SIGN
f S

INTERSTATE D YES O NO

WiTHOUT ADMITTING GUHT I PROWSE TO APPEAR AS DIRECTED HEREIN ON OR BEFORE:.

-SUSPENDED-

D

MttE POST NO.

A.M./PJM.

V

\-<ff'-nrA.i

,^ru^C Mivq V-Uis

StGNATi

I CERTIFY THAT COPY Of THIS SU<
TO LAW ON THEykfrQyt DATE
DID COMMITTOEOfFpfeTpClLEtl

AND INFORMATION WAS DULY SERVED UPON THE DEFENDANT ACCORDING
>W OR BELIEVE AND SO ALLEGE THAT THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT
FORTH CONTRARY TO LAW.
• <r—v

DEPUTY

COMPIAINAIJT

NUMBER

jV/L>

'

& _JT

(LflCfayArt
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS

DATE.
WHITE- Court 1
WHITE - Court 7

.A.D.I*
CANARYDefendant

PINK - Auditor
BLUE - Deputy

.JUDGE.
DATE SENT TO DLD

DOCKET NO.

